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JUST CAUSE DISCIPLINE FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING 
IN THE NEW GILDED AGE: WILL THE LAW LOOK THE 
OTHER WAY? 
William A. Herbert and Alicia McNally* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We live and work in an era with the moniker of the New Gilded Age to 
describe the growth in societal income inequality.1  The appropriateness of 
the designation is not limited to empirical evidence of the growing gap in 
wealth distribution.  Another clear emblem of our age is the sharp rise in 
employment without security, which includes contingent and part-time 
work.2  This situation is attributable to many factors including the economic 
impact of the Great Recession, the fissuration of work,3 the domination of a 
deregulatory ideology concerning fundamental aspects of the employment 
relationship, and the related contraction in union density.  
The slide in job security protections and expectations has been steady 
since 1980.  The historical decline is reflected in a comment by President 
Bill Clinton two decades ago that “[t]he average worker will now 
change jobs eight times in a lifetime,” during a speech where he 
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 1 See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 1–6 (2008); STEVE FRASER, THE AGE OF ACQUIESCENCE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF 
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZED WEALTH AND POWER 8–13, 290–96 (2015); THE NEW GILDED 
AGE: THE CRITICAL INEQUALITY DEBATE OF OUR TIME 1–5 (David Grusky & Tamar Kricheli-Katz 
eds., 2012); Howard Fineman, A New Gilded Age Threatens The State Of Our Union, HUFF. POST (Jan. 
23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/23/gilded-age-state-of-the-union_n_4647348.html; 
Ron Fourier, Obama, Detroit, and the New Gilded Age, NAT. J. (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/obama-detroit-and-the-new-gilded-age-20131205; Elizabeth 
Williamson, What Sequester? Washington Booms as a New Gilded Age Takes Root, WALL ST. J. (May 
31, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323798104578455311507007562.  
Referencing the current era as the New Gilded Age is not without its critics.  See also James Livingston, 
The Myth of a ‘Second Gilded Age,’ THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 31, 2016), 
http://chronicle.com/article/The-Myth-of-a-Second-Gilded/235072.  
 2 Stephen F. Belfort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and 
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 366–67 (2002). 
 3 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); see also STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH 
TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN WORKER (2008). 
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emphasized the need for improved education and job training.4  We now 
have a large percentage of atomized free-floating working individuals who 
comprise what some call the precariat.5   
According to one advocate for contingent workers, there are currently 
42 million freelancers, independent contractors and temporary employees in 
the United States.6  Technology is enabling the so-called “Uberization” of 
jobs that can undermine both income and job security.7  A prime example of 
the trend toward the casualization of work and job insecurity is found in 
higher education, where contingent faculty now represents over 70% of the 
professoriate.8  This trend has consequences beyond the normalization of 
job insecurity and the irregularity of work.  The loss of tenure track 
positions in colleges and universities over the past four decades impacts 
academic freedom and pedagogy.9   
In the New Gilded Age, opponents of tenure and similar job security 
protections in the private and public sectors are in the ascendancy.  There 
are numerous examples of contemporary efforts to end enforceable job 
security as we know it.  They include the constriction of faculty tenure 
protections in Wisconsin,10 a Sixth Circuit decision holding that a tenured 
law school professor did not have a right to continued employment beyond 
                                                                                                                           
 
 4 President Bill Clinton, Remarks to the Export-Import Bank Conference (May 6, 1993), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46526.  Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich made a 
similar remark in 1996: “[T]he job security many workers experienced in the three decades after World 
War II is probably gone forever.”  FRASER, supra note 1, at 262. 
 5 FRASER, supra note 1, at 255–56, 333. 
 6 Sara Horowitz, America, Say Goodbye to the Era of Big Work, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-horowitz-work-freelancers-20140826-story.html. 
 7 Farhad Manjoo, Uber’s Business Model Could Change Your Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/technology/personaltech/uber-a-rising-business-
model.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=1. 
 8 ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION, THE ASSAULT 
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 200–04 (2010). 
 9 Id. at 212–15; see also David Montgomery, Planning for Our Futures, in AUDACIOUS 
DEMOCRACY: LABOR, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 64, 65 
(Steven Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997) (“[Faculty, managers and professional employees] have 
been major targets of casualization at academic institutions throughout the country.  The trend of our 
times is to create a highly paid core of administrators and superstar professors while turning the bulk of 
teaching over to adjunct faculty in smaller colleges and to graduate-student teachers at major research 
universities.  The abolition of tenure has also come under lively consideration by trustees at many 
colleges and universities.”). 
 10 Act of July 13, 2015, § 1209, 2015 Wis. Sess. Laws 55, at 277 (repealing WIS. STAT. § 36.13, 
which governed tenure in higher education); see also  Wis. Bd. of Regents, Regent Policy Document 20-
9, Periodic Post-Tenure Review in Support of Tenured Faculty Development (Mar. 10, 2016),  
https://www.wisconsin.edu/regents/policies/periodic-post-tenure-review-in-support-of-tenured-faculty-
development/; Wis. Bd. of Regents Regent Policy Document 20-23 Faculty Tenure (Mar.10, 2016), 
https://www.wisconsin.edu/regents/policies/faculty-tenure/. 
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the explicit terms of her written employment contract,11 and even proposals 
to modify life tenure for Supreme Court justices under Article III of the 
United States Constitution.12  Currently, there is litigation in California and 
New York seeking to strike down tenure laws for primary and secondary 
teachers on the basis that the application of statutory due process is 
responsible for depriving students of a proper education.13  Additionally, 
other states have ended or substantially modified job security, including 
Indiana’s transformation of most of its state workers into at-will 
employees,14 and Florida’s ending of teacher tenure and replacing it with 
one year contracts following probation.15   
Even a civil liberties organization has argued against legislation that 
would have permitted collective bargaining over police disciplinary 
procedures that might lead to negotiated just cause provisions for police 
officers.16  As part of its rationale, the organization embraced the reasoning 
of a court decision finding that laws from the first Gilded Age ossified New 
York public policy concerning due process protections, thereby prohibiting 
collective bargaining concerning procedures for the discipline of police 
officers.17    
                                                                                                                           
 
 11 See Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2012).   
 12 See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 771–72 (2007). 
 13 Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. June 
10, 2014); Al Baker, Lawsuit Challenges New York’s Teacher Tenure Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/nyregion/lawsuit-contests-new-yorks-teacher-tenure-
laws.html?_r=0.  Leslie Brody, Another Lawsuit Challenge Tenure in New York, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/another-lawsuit-challenges-tenure-in-new-york-1406600721. 
 14 See William A. Herbert, The Chill of a Wintry Light? Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri and the 
Right to Petition in Public Employment, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 586 (2012). 
 15 FLA. ST. § 1012.33 (2014).  While attacks on academic tenure is not a new phenomenon, the 
scope and effectiveness of the current nationwide campaign to ban or limit job security in all lines of 
work is unprecedented.  See Ralph S. Brown, Jr. & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic 
Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 327 (1990) (“But academic tenure is always under attack.  
Usually we hear only grumbling and rumbling, as of distant artillery.  But occasionally there is a 
prolonged fire-fight.  The last such episode flared up in the early 1970s, when the long postwar 
expansion of higher education slowed.  Jobs became scarce.  Many institutions that had been lavish in 
conferring tenure proclaimed themselves ‘over tenured.’” (emphasis in original)). 
 16 Letter from Donna Lieberman et al., Exec. Dir., New York Civil Liberties Union, to Andrew 
Cuomo, Governor of N.Y. (July 23, 2014), http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/Veto_rec_S7801-
A9853_FINAL.pdf (urging a veto of S7801/A9853).  The proposed legislation was the subject of a 
pocket veto when Governor Cuomo did not act on the legislation within the required 30 days after 
receiving it from the state legislature.  Kenneth Lovett, Cuomo Kills Bill That Would Have Made 
Disciplining Cops Subject to Contract Negotiations, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/cuomo-kills-police-discipline-bill-article-1.2097755. 
 17 See In re Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of New York v. New York State Pub. Emp’t Relations 
Bd., 848 N.E.2d 448, 6 N.Y.3d 563, 573 (2006).  The historical premises underlying the decision are 
open to serious question.  See JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 
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Support for the deprivation of the associational right to bargain over 
workplace due process is perhaps the archetypal position to take in the New 
Gilded Age.18  It implicitly incorporates the myth that enforceable 
workplace due process rights guarantee permanent employment regardless 
of misconduct or incompetence. While effective measures to combat police 
brutality are a necessity, the fruit of labor negotiations can take many forms.  
A contract can require, for example, particular penalties for gross acts of 
misconduct and other abuses of authority.19  Gross misconduct, such as 
excessive use of force, is a terminable offense under a just cause standard.20    
 Contemporary practices of some unions that prioritize resources for 
defending most if not all cases of alleged misconduct would probably have 
shocked union leaders from the Gilded Age.21  During that period, many 
skilled trade unions promulgated and enforced their own workplace codes 
and disciplinary rules,22 while other unions focused on organizing for an 
                                                                                                                           
1901, at 83–123, 227–28, 238–42, 268–83 (1970) (describing the historical state-city tensions over the 
administration of the New York City Police Department including multiple efforts to rid patronage from 
the department). 
 18 Restricting collective bargaining conflicts with internationally recognized right to association 
principles.  See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principle and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, 
International Labour Conference, June 18, 1996, 86 Sess. (rev. June 15, 2010), http://www.ilo.org/declar
ation/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm.  Tellingly, the New York Civil Liberties Union 
(“NYCLU”) letter supporting restrictions on collective bargaining was sent a little more than a week 
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to legislation substantially 
restricting negotiations under that state’s collective bargaining law.  Madison Teachers, Inc.  v. Walker, 
851 N.W.2d 337, 384 (Wis. 2014).  Michael Kazin has observed with respect to the American Civil 
Liberties Union that “[t]he group whose original mission was to aid believers in a collective 
commonwealth is now best known for defending erotic artists, physicians who perform abortions, and 
citizens who protest religious displays on public property.” MICHAEL KAZIN, AMERICAN DREAMERS: 
HOW THE LEFT CHANGED A NATION 154 (2011).  To its credit, the NYCLU supports extending 
collective bargaining rights to farmworkers in New York.  See Memorandum from the N.Y. Civil 
Liberties Union to the N.Y. Legislature in Support of the Farmworkers Fair Labor Practices Act (May 
18, 2015), http://www.nyclu.org/content/regarding-farmworkers-fair-labor-practices-act. 
 19 See, e.g., Civil Serv. Comm’n of Phila. v. Wojtusik, 525 A.2d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1987) (determining that assault by a police officer was conduct unbecoming of an officer and constituted 
just cause for discharge). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Danny Haim, At State-Run Homes, Abuse and Impunity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/nyregion/13homes.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabR
eward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%221%22%3A%22RI%3A5%22}&_r=0 (quoting a union representative 
stating “[w]hen we know the person is guilty, we try to convince the person to get out of it by resigning.  
But if the person decides to go forward, we have to do our best job.”). 
 22 See Sanford M. Jacoby, Progressive Discipline in American Industry: Its Origins, Development, 
and Consequences, in 3 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 213, 
224 (David P. Lipsky & David Lewin, eds., 1986); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF 
LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 18–22 (1987); 
Dorothy Sue Cobble, Response, 10 LAB. STUD. WORKING-CLASS HIST. AMS., 111, 115 (2013). 
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eight-hour day and other collective action in the face of powerful employers 
and a hostile judiciary.23   
The imbalance in the dialogue today concerning job security is fostered, 
in part, by the diminution of union density, which stands at 11.1%, with a 
public sector density rate of 35.2% and a private sector rate of only 6.7%.24   
While neoliberals and political conservatives disagree on various non-
economic social issues, they agree on the purported economic need for a 
contingent and insecure workforce. In fact, the New Gilded Age has seen 
the rise of a class of individuals who in the late 19th Century would have 
been labeled “Bourbon Democrats” because of their support for regressive 
tax policies, and their opposition to reforms to alleviate the concentration of 
wealth and power.25   
  In the current era, there is a general lack of knowledge concerning the 
history, public policy, and practical purposes of workplace due process and 
employment security. To help fill that void, we present in Parts II and III, 
infra, a history of the introduction, evolution, and application of the just 
cause doctrine.   
 Part II, infra, reviews Republican President William McKinley’s 
introduction of the just cause doctrine into American labor law during the 
first Gilded Age, just as the employment at-will doctrine became a more 
                                                                                                                           
 
 23 It should not be forgotten or unstated that elements of the Gilded Age labor movement promoted 
and practiced policies of racial exclusion, nativism and sexism.  See PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME II: FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN 
FEDERATION OF LABOR TO THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM 355–68 (1975); RAY GINGER, 
AGE OF EXCESS: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1877 to 1914, at 243–44 (1965); JACKSON LEARS, REBIRTH 
OF A NATION: THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA, 1877-1920, at 98–99 (2009); STERLING D. SPERO & 
ABRAM L. HARRIS, THE BLACK WORKER: THE NEGRO AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 53–57, 87–89 
(1931).  A few years after resigning as Grand Master of the Knights of Labor, Terence V. Powderly was 
appointed by President William McKinley to head the United States Bureau of Immigration where he 
played a key role in the aggressive enforcement of laws excluding Chinese immigration.  See, Delber L. 
McKee, “The Chinese Must Go!” Commissioner General Powderly and Chinese Immigration, 1897-
1902, 44 PENN. HIST., no. 1, Jan. 1997, 37–51.  The Knights of Labor and other unions actively 
supported federal legislation to ban Chinese immigration and took affirmative steps to suppress the 
employment of Chinese workers.  See MONTGOMERY, supra note 22, at 85–86.  The Knights of Labor, 
however, did not embrace other forms of discriminatory policies and practices.  See LEON FINK, 
WORKINGMEN’S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 169 (1983) (“On the 
whole, it can be said that the Knights loomed in the mid-1880s as a beacon of racial enlightenment in a 
dark sea.  In no other contemporary organization, it appears, was there such a quickening dynamic 
toward, rather than away from, race equality.”); see also KAZIN, supra note 18, at 90–92, 127; LEARS, 
supra note 23, at 83.   
 24 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS ECON. NEWS RELEASE, UNION 
MEMBERS SUMMARY (2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.  
 25 See MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 20–21 (2006); 
LEARS, supra note 23, at 150, 176. 
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firmly accepted common law rule.26  The fact that President McKinley was 
responsible for introducing just cause on a national level might surprise 
those arguing in the New Gilded Age that “a sense of contingent and 
temporary attachment to the firm represents the most technologically 
congruent, culturally sophisticated industrial relations policy.”27  
McKinley’s responsibility for introducing just cause counters nostalgic 
visions of the 19th Century by contemporary critics of workplace due 
process protections.28 
The evolution and application of just cause in the 20th century is 
examined in Part III.  That history demonstrates the overlooked influence 
public sector workplace due process principles had on the development of 
private sector labor law.  Following World War II, just cause became a 
normative workplace doctrine and practice in the private and public sectors 
under collective bargaining agreements and public sector statutes.  
Currently, enforceable just cause protections exist in collective bargaining 
agreements and in employment contracts with individuals with sufficient 
leverage to successfully bargain for enforceable job security protections. It 
also exists in certain state statutes and rules.29  Most private sector 
employees remain subject to the at-will doctrine, with the exception of 
those workers in jurisdictions like Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands with wrongful discharge statutes.30  In other states, courts have 
                                                                                                                           
 
 26 See Belfort, supra note 2, at356–57; Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at 
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118, 118–19 (1976); Egon Guttman, The Development and Exercise of 
Appellate Powers in Adverse Action Appeals, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 323–24 (1970); Sanford M. 
Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An 
Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 85 (1982); cf., Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the 
Employment at Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to Its Origins as Based in the Development of 
Advanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75, 85–86 (1995) (challenging Feinman’s historical 
conclusions concerning the development of the at-will doctrine). 
 27 NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 17 (2002). 
 28 Penny Starr, Krugman: Republicans Want ‘To Push Back to 1894’ on Social Issues, 
CNSNEWS.COM (Sept. 8, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/penny-starr/krugman-
republicans-want-push-us-back-1894-social-issues.  In the guise of “reform,” Wisconsin enacted 
legislation eviscerating state civil service reforms enacted during the Gilded Age.  See THE ASSOC. 
PRESS, Wisconsin Recasts Its Civil Service Rules on Hiring, Firing, Punishment and Pay, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/wisconsin-recasts-its-civil-service-rules-on-
hiring-firing-punishment-and-pay.html. 
 29 See infra Part III. 
 30 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2015); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-185m (2008); V.I. 
CODE ANN. tit. 24 §§ 76–79 (1996).  See generally Otero-Burgos v. Inter American Univ., 558 F.3d 1, 
13–14 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing the scope of Puerto Rico’s wrongful discharge statute and ruling that 
the law is inapplicable to a professor with a tenure contract).  
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found that the terms of an employee handbook can create an enforceable 
just cause termination contract.31   
In Part IV, we examine the application of just cause disciplinary 
protections concerning employee use of social media.  Social networking is 
a useful tool for collective communications and actions over workplace 
issues and other protected activities.  It is also a very public platform for 
everyday complaints about work, which were formerly limited to co-
workers, family and actual friends. Too often, it is a forum for trivial 
expressions and pursuits that can have adverse employment consequences.32   
The speed and breadth of electronic communicative interactions 
constitute a troublesome formula that can lead even highly educated 
professionals and academics to post or tweet needlessly inflammatory 
comments leading to employment problems.33  For some, discernment and 
strategic thinking are old-fashioned attributes that have been replaced with a 
compulsion to produce banal, snarky, insulting or adolescent electronic 
messages.34  The confluence of the decline in job security with the advent of 
social networking in the New Gilded Age creates a perfect storm for 
workplace controversies and litigation. 
Our analysis concerning the application of just cause to social media 
activities is premised upon the view that the doctrine’s principles are an 
important and necessary counter-weight to the ever-present temptation for 
overreaction in the Web 2.0 culture. The core principles of proper notice, a 
                                                                                                                           
 
 31 See Freeze v. City of Decherd, 753 F.3d 661, 666–68 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 489 
(2014) (discussing where a city’s resolution that unequivocally adopted a police handbook that included 
a provision limiting discharges only for good cause created a contractual right protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275, 
277 (S.D. 1983); see also Natalie Bucciarelli Pederson, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How 
Courts Interpret Employee Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 106–07 (2008) 
(discussing the purposes of employee handbooks and providing examples of cases where courts found 
an implied contract in the employee handbook); Michael Rhodes Wallace,  Employee Manuals as 
Implied Contracts: The Guidelines That Bind, 27 TULSA L.J. 263, 263–64 (1991) (discussing instances 
where Texas and Oklahoma courts found implied contracts in handbooks).  
 32 William A. Herbert, Can’t Escape from the Memory: Social Media and Public Sector Labor Law, 
40 N. KY. L. REV. 427 (2013). 
 33 See Colleen Flaherty, Protected Tweet?, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 23, 2013), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/09/23/u-kansas-professor-suspended-after-anti-nra-tweet  
(describing controversy at the University of Kansas concerning a tenured journalism professor’s tweet 
about gun violence in response to recent shootings in Washington, D.C.); Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Suspended Lawyer Blames Leisure Lifestyle for Misstatements, Acknowledges Snarky Emails, ABA J. 
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 10, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/suspended_lawyer_bl
ames_leisure_lifestyle_for_misstatements_acknowledges_sn; see also Herbert, supra note 32, at 429–31 
(noting multiple examples where professionals were disciplined for their inappropriate comments on 
social media). 
 34 See Weiss, supra note 33. 
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fair evidentiary investigation, an opportunity to be heard, nondiscriminatory 
treatment, and progressive discipline are essential ingredients for workplace 
due process.35 Those principles are important because they help encourage 
employee and employer discernment when it comes to the use of, and 
response to, social networking.  
The velocity of image and information distribution through social 
networking and other media tends to eclipse patience for due process.  A 
flawed or overzealous process can lead to counterproductive decisions for 
the employer and even false employee confessions.36  In contrast, a 
substantively clear and procedurally rich process has a greater likelihood of 
leading to a reasonable and proper decision, employee acceptance of the 
decision to discipline, and the avoidance of litigation or grievances.37 
The electronic media culture of the 21st Century breeds overreaction, 
the antithesis of deliberative fact gathering and analysis.38  The forced 
resignation of Shirley Sherrod from the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 
2010 is a prime example.  There, rapid technologically distributed 
“evidence” of purported misconduct led to the roar of a wave of 
overreaction that drowned out any semblance of workplace fairness.39   
State laws, discussed in Part IV infra, prohibiting employers from 
requiring employees to permit access to personal social media pages reflect 
a growing concern over employee electronic privacy and employer 
overzealousness.40  However, such laws represent only a speed bump when 
it comes to workplace due process. 
Even in the absence of enforceable just cause requirements in a 
particular workplace, the application of the doctrine’s principles to social 
media misconduct is advantageous for employers and employees.  An 
important bi-product of procedural justice is the strong evidentiary record 
that would become relevant in subsequent litigated claims of alleged 
unlawful motivation behind the imposition of discipline.   
                                                                                                                           
 
 35 J. Michael McGuinness, Procedural Due Process Rights of Public Employees: Basic Rules and a 
Rationale for a Return to Rule-Oriented Process, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 931, 935 (1999). 
 36 See Saul Elbein, When Employees Confess, Sometimes Falsely, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/business/when-employees-confess-sometimes-falsely.html?_r=0. 
 37 See Mark Harcourt et al., Employment at Will Versus Just Cause Dismissal: Applying the Due 
Process Model of Procedural Justice, LAB. L.J., June 1, 2013. 
 38 See, e.g., Richard Cohen, The Firing of Shirley Sherrod—And the Cowardice of Tom Vislack, 
WASH. POST (July 21, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/07/the_firing_of_shirl
ey_sherrod.html. 
 39 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, LESSONS LEARNED FROM USDA’S HANDLING OF THE SHIRLEY 
SHERROD RESIGNATION, http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA%20internal%20review.pdf. 
 40 See Robert Sprague, No Surfing Allowed: A Review & Analysis of Legislation Prohibiting 
Employers from Demanding Access to Employees’ & Job Applicants’ Social Media Accounts, 24 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481, 485–88 (2014). 
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In analyzing the proper application of just cause to alleged electronic 
misconduct, we are cognizant of the scholarly debate over whether the at-
will doctrine should be replaced by a universal just cause employment 
rule.41  Just cause principles have been legislated for decades, but primarily 
with respect to public sector employment.42  As we note in Part V, it is 
highly unlikely that new broad just cause legislation will be enacted in the 
near future in the absence of concerted efforts to bring the doctrine’s 
workplace fairness principles back into national consciousness.43  Instead, 
we propose a narrower remedial approach responsive to the growth in 
workplace rules that effectively mandate arbitration to resolve employee 
statutory claims. 
II.  THE INTRODUCTION OF JUST CAUSE IN THE GILDED AGE 
The common law employment at-will doctrine solidified in the United 
States during the Gilded Age following publication of Horace Gray Wood’s 
influential book, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant.44 According 
to Wood,  
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima 
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, 
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, 
week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and 
no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate 
fixed for whatever time the party may serve.45 
The doctrine remains today “the legal norm for the vast majority of 
American workers.”46  It is the default rule that underlies most employer-
                                                                                                                           
 
 41 Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New Perspective on the Employment At-
Will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 276 (2013). 
 42 See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment At Will, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 31 n.83 (1993). 
 43 Arguably, the low union density rate should precipitate unions and their supporters to proactively 
organize in support of just cause legislation and referenda..  See Rand Wilson, “Just Cause:” Isn’t it 
Time for All Workers to Have More Job Security?, TRUTHOUT (Aug. 3, 2013, 2:06 PM), 
http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/17964-just-cause-isnt-it-time-for-all-workers-to-have-more-job-
security. 
 44 See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895); Feinman, supra note 26, at 
125–27 (setting forth a legal historic description of the solidification of the at-will doctrine during the 
Gilded Age). 
 45 HORACE GRAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 
(Albany, N.Y., Weeds, Parsons and Co. 1877); see Belfort, supra note 32, at 356–57. 
 46 Schwab, supra note 42, at 28; see also Feinman, supra note 26, at 118; Jacoby, supra note 26; cf. 
Ballam, supra note 26. 
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employee relationships.47 Under the doctrine, an employee can be 
terminated at any time without being given any explanation, notice, an 
opportunity to respond, a hearing or a neutral decision-maker.48  Employees 
subject to the employment at-will doctrine remain protected against 
unlawfully motivated employer actions under federal and state anti-
discrimination laws.49    
It is often forgotten that another alternative doctrine, just cause, was 
introduced into American labor law during the Gilded Age. In 1897, 
President McKinley, following his defeat of William Jennings Bryan, 
mandated just cause termination through an amendment to federal civil 
service rules. This reform unilaterally restricted his administration’s 
discretion in discharging federal civil service employees by imposing 
important procedural safeguards.  Like President Martin Van Buren’s 1840 
executive order imposing a ten-hour day in federal public works, 
McKinley’s 1897 order is an example of the unremembered principle that 
the government should function as a model employer when it comes to 
labor standards rather than as a follower of prevalent private sector 
standards.50    
The action by McKinley of placing restraints on the executive power of 
discharge was in keeping with his relative moderation on labor issues 
during his career.51  As a congressman, he favored legislation to mandate an 
eight-hour day in federal employment and for work performed by 
employees of government contractors.52  As Governor of Ohio, he 
                                                                                                                           
 
 47 See Feinman, supra note 26, at 118. 
 48 See id. (explaining that the at-will doctrine allows an employer to “discharge an employee 
without notice and without cause”); Schwab, supra note 42, at 8 (explaining that under the at-will 
doctrine, “an employer can fire [employees] for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all”). 
 49 Schwab, supra note 42, at 8.  However, court cases involving allegations of unlawful motivated 
discrimination are costly for all concerned, notoriously difficult to prove, and are commonly dismissed 
at summary judgment.  See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556–57 (2001).   
 50 See DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862-
1872, at 321 (1981) (describing efforts in the 1860s to convince Congress to make the federal 
government a model employer by imposing an 8-hour day for federal workers); STERLING D. SPERO, 
GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 83–84 (1948).  The model employer rationale was utilized by Samuel 
Gompers in his August 1883 testimony before Congress in support of a law mandating an 8-hour day for 
federal workers.  Samuel Gompers, Excerpts from Samuel Gompers’ Testimony before the Education 
and Labor Committee of the U.S. Senate, Aug. 16, 1883, in 1 THE SAMUEL GOMPERS PAPERS: THE 
MAKING OF A UNION LEADER, 1850-86, at 289, 321–24 (Stuart B. Kaufman, ed. 1986). 
 51 See, e.g., CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM MCKINLEY, THE EIGHT-HOUR LAW (1890), reprinted in 
SAMUEL FALLOWS, LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY, OUR MARTYRED PRESIDENT 243, 243–45 (1901). 
 52 Id. (“The tendency of the times the world over is for shorter hours for labor, shorter hours in the 
interest of health, shorter hours in the interest of humanity, shorter hours in the interest of the home and 
the family; and the United States can do no better service to labor and its own citizens than to set the 
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supported workplace safety legislation and introduced a system of voluntary 
interest arbitration as a means of preventing and resolving labor disputes.53  
During his presidency, he created a commission to examine garment 
industry sweatshops.54  Referencing those actions is not to suggest that 
McKinley was or is a labor icon.  His key political advisor, Senator Mark 
Hanna, was described by Gabriel Kolko as being “as pro-union as one could 
be without giving up a commitment to the open shop.”55  The relative 
moderation of McKinley in the Gilded Age concerning labor and civil 
service, however, is a significant contrast to New Gilded Age opponents of 
unions, and job security. 
While many issues were debated in the 1896 election, most notably 
bimetallism and tariff policy, the issue of just cause termination was not a 
topic of discussion.56  The 1896 Republican platform called for the honest 
enforcement and possible extension of the federal merit system under the 
Civil Service Act of 1883,57 which mandated competitive examinations for 
applicants to federal classified positions and prohibited politically 
motivated discharges.58  In contrast, Bryan argued for fixed terms of office 
in all federal civil departments, reflecting the Democratic Party platform.59  
One Bryan critic described his call for fixed terms as masking “a general 
                                                                                                                           
example to states, to corporations and to individuals employing men by declaring that, so far as the 
government is concerned, eight hours shall constitute a day’s work, and be all that is required of its 
laboring force.”). 
 53 SCOTT MILLER, THE PRESIDENT AND THE ASSASSIN: MCKINLEY, TERROR, AND EMPIRE AT THE 
DAWN OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY 48 (2011); H. WAYNE MORGAN, WILLIAM MCKINLEY AND HIS 
AMERICA 121–22 (rev. ed. 2003).  In terms of labor history, however, McKinley’s use of federal troops 
to break the strike of the Western Federation of Miners in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho in 1899 overshadows 
his earlier relative moderation.  See J. ANTHONY LUCAS, BIG TROUBLE: A MURDER IN A SMALL 
WESTERN TOWN SETS OFF A STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA 115–18, at 139–54 (1997). 
 54 WEIL, supra note 3, at 224. 
 55 GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN 
HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 65 (1963); see also PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC 
STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 235 (2010) (Hanna stated: “My plan is to have organized union labor 
Americanized in the best sense, and thoroughly educated to an understanding of its responsibilities, and 
in this way to make it the ally of the capitalist, rather than a foe with which to grapple.”) (quoting 
MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003)).  
 56 See William McKinley: Campaigns and Elections, MILLER CTR. PUB. AFFAIRS (2015), 
http://millercenter.org-/president/biography/mckinley-campaigns-and-elections. 
 57 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403.  
 58 Id. sec. 2, sec. 13. 
 59 WILLIAM J. BRYAN, THE FIRST BATTLE: A STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1896 459–62 (1896), 
http://segonku.unl.edu/~nsanderson/speeches/Trip3/Sept19_Washington,DC.html.  The Democrat 
Platform stated: “We are opposed to life tenure in the public service, except as provided in the 
Constitution.  We favor appointments based on merit, fixed terms of office, and such an administration 
of the civil-service laws as will afford equal opportunities to all citizens of ascertained fitness.”  Gerhard 
Peters & John T. Woolley, Political Party Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1896, THE AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29586. 
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attack upon the [civil service] system which bases appointment upon 
established fitness, and continuance and advancement in office upon the 
degree of ability and fidelity displayed in the service.”60  As Steve Fraser 
has noted, Bryan’s Cross of Gold speech at the Democratic convention 
focused on the coinage of silver to the exclusion of most labor subjects.61  
Bryan’s efforts to obtain labor support for his campaign resulted in an 
endorsement by Eugene V. Debs but not from Samuel Gompers or Terence 
V. Powderly.62 
The Democratic Party platform that year, and Bryan’s deemphasizing 
of labor issues in his famous speech, contrasted with the 1892 Populist 
Party platform.  In 1892, the Populist Party called for a constitutional 
amendment to mandate that “all persons engaged in the Government service 
shall be placed under a civil service regulation of the most rigid 
character . . . .”63 Additionally, the Populist Party expressed sympathy for 
“efforts of organized workingmen to shorten the hours of labor, and 
demand a rigid enforcement of the existing eight-hour law on Government 
work, and ask that a penalty clause be added to the said law.”64   
During the course of the 1896 campaign, federal employees organized 
the National Civil Service Association, which held a convention in 
Washington, D.C. with delegates from around the country.65  Among the 
convention’s resolutions was a demand that civil service discharges be 
based on cause, that the allegations be set forth in writing and the employee 
be given an opportunity to respond to the charges.66  
Less than five months after taking office, McKinley issued an order on 
July 27, 1897 modifying Civil Service Rule II contained in a May 1896  
Executive Order by his predecessor, Grover Cleveland.67  Prior to 
                                                                                                                           
 
 60 H.T. Newcomb, The Crisis of Civil Service Reform, 166 N. AM. REV. 196, 197 (1898). 
 61 Steve Fraser, Two Gilded Ages, RARITAN, vol. 29, no. 1, 2009, at 18, 29–30. 
 62 KAZIN, supra note 18, at 68–69; NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 
158–59 (1982).  In response to an inquiry concerning the 1896 election, Powderly stated “I have no 
doubt that Mr. McKinley will be elected.  I am not only not in favor of Mr. Bryan’s election, but am 
unequivocally in favor of the election of Major McKinley.”  Mr. Powderly for McKinley, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 28, 1896), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9504EFD91E3AE533A2575BC2
A96E9C94679ED7CF.  While the American Federation of Labor was officially neutral during the 
campaign, Gompers may have privately supported and voted for Bryan.  See BERNARD MANDEL, 
SAMUEL GOMPERS: A BIOGRAPHY 160–61 (1963). 
 63 The Populist Party Platform, 1892, in RICHARD D. HEFFNER & ALEXANDER HEFFNER, A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 267, 270 (Penguin Books 2013) (1952). 
 64 Id. at 272. 
 65 SPERO, supra note 50, at 169–71. 
 66 Id. at 171. 
 67 President Grover Cleveland, May 7, 1896 Executive Order, in LIST AND INDEX OF PRESIDENTIAL 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS: UNNUMBERED SERIES 1789–1941, at 165 (Clifford L. Lord, ed., Michael Glazier, 
Inc. 1979) (1944). 
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McKinley’s order, Civil Service Rule II prohibited politically and 
religiously motivated discharges.68  It also prohibited disparate treatment by 
requiring that disciplinary “penalties like in character shall be imposed for 
like offenses . . . .”69   
McKinley’s order added a new paragraph eight to Civil Service Rule II 
mandating federal officials to have just cause before terminating a civil 
servant appointed pursuant to a competitive examination.70  The civil 
service rule amendment stated: 
 
(8)  No removal shall be made from any position subject to competitive 
examination except for just cause and upon written charges filed with 
the head of the Department, or other appointing officer, and of which the 
accused shall have notice and opportunity to make defense.71  
 
The just cause amendment echoed a three year old administrative order 
imposed by Postmaster-General W.S. Bissell that stated “[n]o carrier shall 
be removed except for cause, and upon written charges filed with the Post-
Office Department, and of which the carrier shall have full notice, and an 
opportunity to make defense.”72  The post office directive applied to letter 
carriers, a group that had unionized in conjunction with the Knights of 
Labor over issues including the eight-hour day.73 
The core rationale for instituting basic due process procedures in the 
19th Century was conservative in nature: to bolster the merit-based civil 
service system by requiring an evidentiary-based decision making process 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of intemperate, arbitrary and 
discriminatory discipline.74  It represented a top-down directive to further 
                                                                                                                           
 
 68 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Grover Cleveland: Executive Order – Civil Service Rules, 
Rule II, § 3, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=70805. 
 69 Id. at Rule II, § 6. 
 70 Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 27 (2004). 
 71 President William McKinley, July 9, 1897 Executive Order, in FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N JULY 1, 1897, TO JUNE 30, 1898, at 19 (1898) [hereinafter FIFTEENTH 
ANNUAL REPORT].  
 72 Order No. 235, Order of the Postmaster-General Forbidding Removals of Carriers Except for 
Cause (June 29, 1894), in THIRTEENTH REPORT OF THE U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, JULY 1, 1895 TO 
JUNE 30, 1896, at 52 (1897); see also Employes Reassured, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 1897) (describing the 
relationship between McKinley’s civil service amendment and Postmaster General Bissell’s 1894 
directive). 
 73 STERLING DENHARD SPERO, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN A GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF 
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION IN THE POSTAL SERVICE 63–73 (reprint ed., Arno Press 1971) (1927). 
 74 See EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 399 (1979); see also ARI 
HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865-
1883 (2d ed. 1968) (detailing the history of the civil service reform movement prior to the enactment of 
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effectuate civil service reform and to help stabilize and rationalize the 
federal civil service.75   
As Edmund Morris has aptly noted, it is difficult for a modern citizen 
“to understand the emotions which Civil Service Reform aroused in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth” century.76  The middle-class civil service reform 
movement’s sought to replace “personal, informal, and political methods of 
management in favor of more rational and bureaucratic administrative 
techniques” as the size of the federal workforce grew following the Civil 
War.77  The movement was comprised of professionals and businessmen 
who sought to replace the control of government by political partisans with 
“a meritorious, intellectual, patrician elite” that would lead to more efficient 
and dependable governmental services.78   
The nature of the movement is reflected in the fact that civil service 
reform advocates were or had been proponents of suffrage restrictions to 
check mass democracy and bring administrative efficiencies to public 
service.79  Theodore Roosevelt described the leadership as “tepidly 
indifferent or actively hostile to reforms that were of profound and far-
reaching social and industrial consequence,” “at best lukewarm” about 
efforts to improve working class conditions, and “positively hostile to 
movements” seeking to curb corporate power.80  The reform movement’s 
leadership opposed the formation of public sector unions, viewing such 
associational activities as antithetical to efforts at depoliticizing the 
administration of government.81   
The National Civil Service Reform League, the reform movement’s 
primary organization did not seek the support of the American labor 
movement, although the American Federation of Labor (“AFL”) favored 
civil service reform at all levels of government.82  One exception to the lack 
                                                                                                                           
the Civil Service Act of 1883). 
 75 See First Annual Message (December 6, 1897) – William McKinley, MILLER CTR. PUB. AFFAIRS, 
http://millercenter.org/president/mckinley/speeches/speech-3769 (McKinley’s civil service changes 
placed it upon “a still firmer basis of business methods and personal merit.”). 
 76 MORRIS, supra note 74, at 398. 
 77 CINDY SONDIK ARON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE: MIDDLE-CLASS 
WORKERS IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 7, 96 (1987). 
 78 Id. at 106. 
 79 See DAVID QUIGLEY, SECOND FOUNDING: NEW YORK CITY, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 167 (2004); MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: 
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA 1880-1920, at 6–7, 9, 26–27 (1977). 
 80  THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 146 (1913); see also HOOGENBOOM, supra note 
74 (detailing a history of the civil service reform movement prior to the enactment of the Civil Service 
Act of 1883). 
 81 See SPERO, supra note 73, at 26–27. 
 82 FRANK MANN STEWART, THE NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE REFORM LEAGUE: HISTORY, 
ACTIVITIES, AND PROBLEMS 100 (1929).  At its 1892 convention, the AFL approved the following 
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of outreach was the 1888 address by civil service reform leader Henry A. 
Richmond to the Buffalo Central Labor Union.  In his speech, Richmond 
urged labor support for civil service reform to help improve public 
education through the elimination of patronage employment.83   
By definition, McKinley’s introduction of just cause as an extension of 
civil service reform was limited to a small percentage of middle-class men 
and women in the American workforce who held classified positions at 
federal agencies subject to competitive examinations.84  Those holding 
temporary positions or who worked as laborers for the federal government 
were excluded from coverage under the federal Civil Service Act of 1883.85 
Besides being limited to a select middle-class group in the federal 
service, the McKinley order contained another flaw replicated today in most 
contracts and laws with a just cause standard: it did not  define the meaning 
of just cause.86  Nevertheless, the civil service reform put into place in 
McKinley’s first term included core components of just cause that would 
become central to workplace due process in the 20th century—written 
disciplinary charges with notice, and an opportunity to defend against those 
charges.87  It also supplemented two other important elements of just cause, 
already contained in the civil service rules: nondiscrimination, and equal 
treatment in disciplinary penalties.88 
The significance of McKinley’s executive reform was not lost on 
Gilded Age observers.  Banker Frank Vanderlip, then serving as Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury, emphasized that: 
 These amendments to the civil service rules which the President has 
signed are the most distinct steps forward that have been made in the civil 
service regulations since the passage of the [Civil Service Law of 1883].  
Up to the present time nearly all the regulations have been aimed at 
throwing safeguards around the method of entry into the service.  There 
                                                                                                                           
resolution: “That we declare in favor of municipal, state and national civil service reform.” REPORT OF 
PROCEEDINGS, TWELFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 46 (1892), 
reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (1906).   
 83 See HENRY A. RICHMOND, THE WORKINGMEN’S INTEREST IN CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: THE 
SPOILS SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: ADDRESS OF HENRY A. RICHMOND BEFORE THE CENTRAL 
LABOR UNION OF BUFFALO (1888). 
 84 See Matthew W. Finkin, “A Higher Order of Liberty in the Workplace”: Academic Freedom and 
Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practices and Law, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 357, 358 n.8 
(1990). 
 85 See ARON, supra note 77, at 107, 117. 
 86 See FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71. 
 87 Id.  
 88 President Grover Cleveland, May 7, 1896 Executive Order, in LIST AND INDEX OF PRESIDENTIAL 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS: UNNUMBERED SERIES 1789–1941, at 165 (Clifford L. Lord, ed., Michael Glazier, 
Inc. 1979) (1944). 
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has been almost nothing looking toward the enforcement of the spirit of 
civil service reform within the service itself. 
 
 Many prominent civil service reformers believe that regulations 
enforcing proper observance of the spirit of civil service reform within the 
service would be of much greater importance than anything that could be 
formulated in regard to the entry into the service itself, and it is in this 
direction the amendment which has just been signed by the President is 
aimed.89 
During a speech in December 1897 before the National Civil Service 
Reform League, Carl Schurz stated that “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that 
[the imposition of just cause] was greeted with a round of applause that 
resounded all over the country” and received support from “[t]he best part 
of the public press.”90  Gilded Age business leaders also supported 
McKinley’s civil service rule change because they believed it would 
improve stability in government and strengthen the morale of federal 
employees.91  The following year, the United States Civil Service 
Commission described the new rule as “one of the most important ever 
issued relating to the executive civil service, and after a full year’s 
operation has met the hearty approval of the public and of most of the 
executive officers of the Government.”92 
 Following issuance of McKinley’s order, however, the New York 
Times expressed a clear ambivalence to the imposition of just cause: 
The privilege of “full notice and opportunity to make defense” given to the 
person removed is open to two objections.  One is that it breaks the force 
of strict discipline; the other is that, as the rules have the force of law, 
occasion may be taken by the courts to adjudge, first, whether the cause of 
removal is “just”; second, whether the “written charges” are sustained, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
 89 The Civil Service Rules: Important Changes Promulgated by President McKinley Yesterday, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 1897), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B02E4D61E3AE533A257
5AC2A9619C94669ED7C.  In the following decades, Vanderlip became president of the First National 
City Bank, and later was involved in the development of proposed legislation, which was the precursor 
of the Federal Reserve Act.  LEARS, supra note 23, at 319.  He and his wife Narcissa Vanderlip were 
active reformers and were later colleagues of Eleanor Roosevelt.  See BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: VOLUME ONE 1884-1933, at 288–90 (1992). 
 90 Carl Schurz, President, League to Mun. Reform Ass’ns, Address of the Annual Meeting of the 
Nat’l Civil Serv. Reform League at Cincinnati: The Democracy of the Merit System (Dec, 16, 1897), 
http://www.angelfire.com/ma3/bobwb/schurz/speech/merit.html. 
 91 Civil Service Reform: Value of Permanency to Washington Business Men, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 
1897), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A06E0DF1330E333A25750C1A96E9C94
669ED7CF.  
 92 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71. 
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thus introduce confusion in the service.93  
The objections expressed in the New York Times’ editorial continue to 
reverberate today because enforceable just cause remains at odds with the 
at-will employment rule.94  Just cause principles continue to be 
overshadowed by the hegemony of at-will employment prerogatives that 
make due process in most private sector workplaces subject to employer 
self-regulation and restraint.    
The New York Times editorial’s focus on the absence of a definition 
for just cause in McKinley’s order was prescient, as well.95  There remain 
today significant differences over the substantive and procedural meaning 
emanating from the simple two-word phrase.  Those differences affect how 
employers, arbitrators, and the courts will treat alleged employee 
misconduct in cyberspace.   
The newspaper’s concern over judicial encroachment into executive 
authority to discipline resulting from McKinley’s just cause amendment, 
however, was misplaced.  In fact, the courts during the Gilded Age were 
openly hostile to labor rights, active in enjoining strikes and boycotts, and 
resistant to enforcing legal limitations on employer authority.96  As William 
E. Forbath has written: 
Gilded Age labor also discovered that it was the courts that principally 
determined how labor legislation once passed, would fare.  Judicial review 
was the most visible and dramatic fashion in which courts curtailed labor’s 
ability to use laws to redress asymmetries of power in the employment 
relationship.  By the turn of the century state and federal courts had 
invalidated roughly sixty labor laws.  During the 1880s and 1890s courts 
were far more likely than not to strike down the very laws that labor 
sought most avidly.97   
Judicial hostility to labor law reform in the Gilded Age is best 
represented by Lochner v. New York,98 where the Supreme Court struck 
down a state law prohibiting a bakery or confectionary employee from 
                                                                                                                           
 
 93 Mr. McKinley and the Civil Service, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1897), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/ 
archive-free/pdf?res=9E07E7D91F39E433A25753C3A9619C94669ED7CF. 
 94 See Fineman, supra note 41, at 275.  
 95 See Mr. McKinley and the Civil Service, supra note 93. 
 96 CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE 
ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 60–67 (1985). 
 97 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 38 (1991) 
(footnotes omitted); see also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, 64–68 
(1949). 
 98 198 U.S. 45, 57–61 (1905). 
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being permitted or required to work more than sixty hours  a week or more 
than ten hours in a day.  In Lochner, the Court concluded that the state 
prohibition was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it purportedly interfered with the liberty of contract between employers and 
individual employees.99   
In light of the ideological predisposition of the Gilded Age judiciary, it 
is not surprising that McKinley’s just cause rule and similar rules were 
unenforceable in court.  In Page v. Moffett100 and Carr v. Gordon,101 
employees unsuccessfully sought to enjoin their terminations with federal 
judges concluding that while McKinley had the power to impose just cause 
on the exercise of the power of removal, the limitation was not enforceable 
in court because it was not codified in the Civil Service Law of 1883 and 
was rescindable by the president.102  
In Shruleff v. United States,103 the Supreme Court held that McKinley 
had an unfettered right to summarily terminate a federal appraiser of 
merchandise without notice and a hearing when the reason for discharge 
was not for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” as set 
forth in statute.104  In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that:  
To construe the statute as contended for by appellant is to give an 
appraiser of merchandise the right to hold that office during his life or 
until he shall be found guilty for some act specified in the statute.  If this 
be true, a complete revolution in the general tenure of office is effected, by 
implication, with regard to this particular office.  We think it quite 
inadmissible to attribute an intention on the part of Congress to make such 
an extraordinary change in the usual rule governing the tenure of office, 
and one which is to be applied to this particular office only, without 
stating such an intention in plain and explicit language, instead of leaving 
it to be implied from doubtful inferences.105 
The problems associated with defining just cause and enforcing its 
principles were highlighted following McKinley’s assassination.  Upon 
                                                                                                                           
 
 99 Id. at 57–58, 62. 
 100 85 F. 38 (D. N.J. 1898). 
 101 82 F. 373 (N.D. Ill. 1897). 
 102 See Page, 85 F. at 40–41; Carr, 82 F. at 379–80. 
 103 189 U.S. 311 (1903). 
 104 See id. at 313–15 (quoting Customs Administrative Act, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (1890)). 
 105 Id. at 316; see also Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 294 (1990) (“Unless, therefore, there be 
some specific provision to the contrary, the action of the Secretary of the Interior in removing the 
petitioner from office on account of inefficiency is beyond review in the courts either by mandamus to 
reinstate him or by compelling payment of salary as though he had not been removed.”). 
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taking office, Theodore Roosevelt issued an order to narrow the substance 
and procedure of the just cause rule.  This action, along with his subsequent 
open shop mandate for federal agencies,106 and his severe restrictions on the 
right of federal workers to petition Congress,107 are indicative of 
Roosevelt’s own patrician hostility to collective labor rights, particularly in 
the public sector. 
Under the guise of eliminating what Roosevelt termed 
“misunderstandings,” his May 1902 declaration limited the just cause rule 
to a prohibition against discharges motivated by political or religious 
considerations, permitted terminations for “any cause” promoting 
“efficiency of the service” and narrowed the due process component of the 
rule by making a hearing discretionary:108 
Now, for the purpose of preventing all such misunderstandings and 
improper constructions of said section, it is hereby declared that the term 
“just cause,” as used in Section 8, Civil Service Rule II, is intended to 
mean any cause, other than one merely political or religious, which will 
promote the efficiency of the service; and nothing contained in said rule 
shall be construed to require the examination of witnesses or any trial or 
hearing except in the discretion of the officer making the removal.109 
Subsequent executive orders by Roosevelt and his successor William 
Howard Taft resulted in further modification of the just cause provision.110  
The period of fluctuation regarding just cause for federal employees 
through presidential orders ended when Congress enacted the Lloyd-La 
Follette Act of 1912, which mandated that discharge in the federal service 
be based upon: 
[C]ause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons 
given in writing, and the person whose removal is sought shall have notice 
of the same and of any charges preferred against him and be furnished 
with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally 
answer the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; but no 
                                                                                                                           
 
 106 EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 266, 271–72 (2001). 
 107 See Herbert, supra note 14, at 591. 
 108 See EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, JULY 1, 1900 TO 
JUNE 30, 1901, at 58 (1902) [hereinafter EIGHTEENTH REPORT]; Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution 
Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U PA. L. REV. 942, 956–57 (1976) (quoting the 
same). 
 109  EIGHTEENTH REPORT, supra note 108.   
 110 See Frug, supra note 108, at 957–58; Guttman, supra note 26, at 324 (describing how Congress 
pressured Taft to return to McKinley’s approach, which required just cause for removal, notice of 
removal, and an opportunity to respond). 
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examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except 
in the discretion of the officer making the removal . . . .111 
 The redefinition of just cause as a discharge promoting workplace 
efficiency was elastic in nature and granted far more management 
discretion.  The definition maintained a prohibition against irrational 
employer criteria such as certain forms of workplace discrimination and a 
mandate for evenhanded penalties consistent with the nature of the 
misconduct.112  Procedurally, just cause continued to require written 
allegations, proper notice to the employee, and an opportunity to be 
heard.113  These basic procedures were aimed at requiring an evidentiary-
based decision making process to evaluate alleged misconduct or 
incompetence, thereby checking the temptation of managerial overreach.114  
They demonstrated a clear understanding of the importance of enforceable 
checks and balances and fair treatment within the workplace, values that are 
dissipating in the New Gilded Age. 
The Gilded Age just cause procedures, however, did not guarantee a 
fair hearing, the examination of witnesses and a disinterested decision-
maker.115  The lack of those additional elements, along with a judiciary 
unwilling to enforce the just cause requirement and hostile to labor reform, 
substantially undermined procedural workplace justice in that period.   
III. DEFINING JUST CAUSE IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
      The rise of trade unions and collective bargaining in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries began to alter the existing asymmetrical bargaining 
position of employer and employee.   
      At the time of McKinley’s 1897 executive order, the Chicago lathers’ 
union had a contract that mandated an eight-hour workday but gave the 
employer “the right to discharge such men at his option, without any 
interference from the Lathers’ Union.”116  In contrast, one of the first 
                                                                                                                           
 
 111 Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 
7211, 7511–14 (2012)); Frug, supra note 108, at 958 n.78 (citing Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912); see 
also Herbert, supra note 15, at 592–94 (discussing the history and purpose of the Lloyd-La Follette Act). 
 112 See Lloyd-La Follette Act § 6. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See Frug, supra note 108, at 958 (stating that Congress essentially codified Taft’s 1912 Executive 
Order in the Lloyd-La Follette Act).  
 115 See Lloyd-La Follette Act § 6. 
 116 Agreement with the Chicago Journeymen Lathers’ Independent Union in WRITTEN TRADE 
AGREEMENTS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., DIV. OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
Bulletin No. 4, Appendix A (1939) [hereinafter WRITTEN TRADE AGREEMENTS]. 
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arbitration decisions to apply just cause might have been a 1904 arbitral 
ruling resolving a dispute over the discharge of a newspaper employee.117 
The 1904 and 1905 contracts between the International Longshoremen, 
Marin and Transport Workers’ Association and the Dock Managers at Lake 
Erie ports mandated that employees not be discharged without just cause 
and anyone discharged will be notified of the cause.118   
     The 1910 garment workers strike in Chicago resulted in the Hart 
Schaffner & Marx agreement with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America.  The agreement mandated that discipline be imposed “with justice 
and with due regard to the reasonable rights of the employee . . . .”119  
While it did not require an employer to have just cause to discipline, the 
agreement did grant a discharged employee the right to challenge her or his 
termination through an appeal to a tripartite Trade Board.120   
During World War I, the War Labor Policies Board proposed impartial 
arbitration as a means for regulating the imposition of discipline and 
discharge in private sector employment.121  Nevertheless, prior to “1920 
only a few industries had well-developed grievance procedures terminating 
in arbitration, namely, coal, the railroads, men’s clothing, and women’s 
garments.”122  Importantly, “[l]ittle is known about the principles that were 
applied in the settlement of disciplinary grievances in these early years.”123  
What is known is that most of the negotiated grievance procedures from the 
1920s did not end in binding arbitration.124   
 Just cause limitations on discipline in negotiated agreements constitute 
collective rights stemming from a vision of industrial democracy, which 
include due process components similar to what McKinley imposed on the 
federal civil service system.  Industrial democracy as a reformist principle 
came to prominence during the Progressive Era.125  For example, when 
                                                                                                                           
 
 117 See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 U. 
FLA L. REV. 373, 391 (1983). 
 118 The Longshoremen’s Agreement: Wages, Hours and Working Conditions at Lake Erie Ports for 
the Coming Year, NAT’L CIV. FED. REV., June 1904, at 4, https://archive.org/details/NationalCivicFeder
ationReview-Vol.1And2. 
 119 EARL DEAN HOWARD, THE HART SCHAFFNER & MARX LABOR AGREEMENT: BEING A 
COMPILATION AND CODIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENTS OF 1911, 1913 AND 1916 AND DECISIONS 
RENDERED BY THE BOARD OF ARBITRATION 14 (rev. ed. 1922–1925). 
 120 Id. at 4–5, 13–14. 
 121 See STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WILL RULE: SIDNEY HILLMAN AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN LABOR 
121 (1991). 
 122 Jacoby, supra note 26, at 225.   
 123 Id. 
 124 See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933, 
at 74 (1960). 
 125 See JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1919-1921, at 27–28 (1997). 
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President Wilson’s President’s Mediation Commission helped to settle an 
Arizona copper miners’ strike in 1917 it emphasized that:  
In place of dislocation strikes the Government must assure the [miners], 
for their own and the Government’s protection, security in their 
employment, (where there is no just cause for discharge,) as well as fair 
and practical machinery for the ordinary adjustment of grievances whether 
real or imaginary, without causing any stoppage of production.126 
A related development during the Progressive Era was the American 
Association of University Professors’ (“AAUP”) 1915 Declaration of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, which defined 
tenure as a permanent faculty appointment in higher education subject to 
dismissal following an internal judicial hearing.127  In 1940, the AAUP 
issued its Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which 
states that following probation “teachers or investigators should have 
permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only 
for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under 
extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.”128  Although 
the AAUP at the time refused to be labeled a union,129 the 1940 Statement 
of Principles incorporated many procedural elements of just cause in its 
definition of acceptable academic practices for terminating a tenured 
teacher: 
Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal for 
cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term appointment, 
should, if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the 
governing board of the institution.  In all cases where the facts are in 
dispute, the accused teacher should be informed before the hearing in 
writing of the charges against [the teacher] and should have the 
opportunity to be heard in [his or her] own defense by all bodies that pass 
judgment upon [the] case.  [The teacher] should be permitted to [be 
accompanied by] an advisor of his [or her] own choosing who may act as 
counsel.  There should be a full stenographic record of the hearing 
available to the parties concerned.  In the hearing of charges of 
                                                                                                                           
 
 126 Federal Mediators End Copper Strike, NY Times, Nov. 2, 1917, at 24, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9806E5DB113AE433A25751C0A9679D946696D6CF. 
 127 See Edward R.A. Seligman et al., General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure, 1 BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 15, 40–42 (1915). 
 128 Academic Freedom and Tenure: Statement of Principles, 1940, 28 BULL. AM. ASS’N U. 
PROFESSORS 84, 86 (1942) [hereinafter 1940 Statement]. 
 129 See PHILO A. HUTCHESON, A PROFESSIONAL PROFESSORIATE: UNIONIZATION, 
BUREAUCRATIZATION AND THE AAUP 14–15 (2000). 
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incompetence[,] the testimony should include that of teachers and other 
scholars, either from [the teacher’s] own or from other institutions.  
Teachers on continuous appointment who are dismissed for reasons not 
involving moral turpitude should receive their salaries for at least a year 
from the date of notification of dismissal whether or not they are 
continued in their duties at the institution.130 
Following the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) in 1935,131 and subsequent public sector collective bargaining 
laws, just cause became a fixture in many labor-management contracts, as 
an essential element of industrial democracy.132   
Early contracts following the NLRA’s enactment, like the May 1938 
contract between B.F. Goodrich Company and the United Rubber Workers 
of America, required that the employer have “proper cause,” and included 
an agreed upon list of twenty offenses that could form the basis for 
discipline.133 Contracts negotiated by the Steel Workers Organizing 
Committee in 1937, and the United Mine Workers in 1939, provided for 
reinstatement and back wages for employees only if it was determined “that 
an injustice has been dealt” the employee.134   
Ever since the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, unanimity 
concerning the precise substance and procedure meant by just cause has 
remained elusive.  A common omission in collective bargaining provisions 
is a definition of the phrase.135  The result has been a general lack of 
                                                                                                                           
 
 130 1940 Statement, supra note 128, at 85–86. 
 131  Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§151–169 (2012)). 
 132 See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 27, at 63 (“Workers could not be discharged without ‘just cause’; 
instead a system of ‘progressive discipline’ ensured that most workers had a second or third or fourth 
chance.”); Clyde W. Summers, Industrial Democracy: America’s Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 29, 48 (1979).  
 133 Goodrich Rubber Agreement with the United Rubber Workers of America (May 27, 1938), in 
WRITTEN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 116, at 309–25, Art. XIII, Appendix C.  
 134 Appalachian Agreement between United Mine Workers and Coal Operators’ Associations (May 
12, 1939), in WRITTEN TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 116, at 281–93; Carnegie–Illinois Steel 
Corporation Agreement and Steel Workers Organizing Committee (Mar. 17, 1937), in WRITTEN TRADE 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 116, at 305–08, § 9. 
 135 See Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No.31, 200 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1569, 1583 n.9 (Aug. 22, 2014) 
(Miscimarra, M., dissenting in part) (describing the ubiquitous nature of “just cause” provisions and the 
difficulty of drafting such provisions); Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of ‘Just 
Cause’ in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 595 (noting that parties, when drafting their 
agreements, rarely define “just cause”).  Similar ambiguities exist concerning what constitutes “adequate 
cause” in higher education tenure cases, with one scholar emphasizing that the standards are “wholly 
within the prerogative of each university” unless the terms of a university’s rules or their application 
violate academic freedom or civil liberties.  See William W. Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary, 
Explanation, and “Defense,” 57 AAUP BULL. 328, 328 (1971).  In light of the distinct history and 
practices of collective bargaining in higher education, we have chosen not to explicitly explore the 
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consistency in how arbitrators define the scope of the contractual limitation 
of an employer’s authority to discipline based on a just cause provision.  In 
effect, the definitional omission empowers the selected arbitrator in a 
particular case to apply her or his notions about just cause.136   
 In post-arbitration litigation, courts are not immune from redefining 
just cause, particularly in disciplinary cases involving difficult facts or in 
turbulent political times.  For example, during the heyday of McCarthyism, 
the California Supreme Court refused to confirm a just cause arbitration 
award reinstating attorney Doris Brin Walker to her private sector 
laboratory position on the grounds that mere membership in the Communist 
Party and participation in its activities constitute just cause for her discharge 
as a matter of public policy.137  An effective cure for that type of judicial 
activism is a clear codification of a definition of just cause through contract 
negotiations or legislation.  In considering a cure, we must be mindful of 
the growing judicial activism reminiscent of the Gilded Age.138 
 In 1966, Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty faced the familiar dilemma of 
arbitrators: being selected to determine a grievance asserting that a 
discharge violated a negotiated just cause provision without the parties’ 
defining the applicable criteria to be applied.139  Due to the lack of a 
contractual definition of just cause in the agreement at issue, Arbitrator 
Daugherty in Enterprise Wire Co.v. Enterprise Independent Union,140 
applied his seven test formulation originally articulated in Grief Brothers 
Cooperage141 that some commentators have described as a “purely 
                                                                                                                           
specific elements of “adequate cause” and how it should be applied in tenure cases involving social 
networking by faculty members. 
 136 Abrams & Nolan, supra note 135, at 595–96. 
 137 Black v. Cutter Labs., 278 P.2d 905, 917 (Cal. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816, cert. dismissed, 
351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
 138 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014) (holding that an open shop is constitutionally 
mandated under the First Amendment for quasi-public employees in a collective bargaining unit). 
 139 Enter. Wire Co. v. Enter. Indep. Union, 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359, 360 (1966) (Daugherty, 
Arb.).  Regarding discipline, Article VIII of the agreement stated: 
 
 Section 1.  Proper Cause.  No employee shall be discharged or otherwise disciplined 
except for proper cause. 
 Section 2.  Discharge of Discipline Grievance.  Any case of discharge or other 
discipline may be taken up through the grievance procedure, but any such grievance must 
be presented within three working days after the disciplinary action occurs.  
 Section 3.  Notice to Union.  The Union shall be notified within one working day of 
any disciplinary action taken against any employee covered by this Agreement. 
 
Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555, 558–59 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.). 
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procedural scheme for determining just cause.”142  While Daugherty’s seven 
tests for just cause143 are the subject of a well-utilized treatise on the 
                                                                                                                           
 
 142 Abrams & Nolan, supra note 135, at 599 n.30. 
 143 The following is Arbitrator Daugherty’s commentary in Grief Brothers Cooperage about defining 
just cause and his seven-test formulation: 
 
 Few if any union-management agreements contain a definition of “just cause.”  
Nevertheless, over the years the opinions of arbitrators in innumerable discipline cases 
have developed a sort of “common law” definition thereof.  This definition consists of a set 
of guide lines or criteria that are to be applied to the facts of any one case, and said criteria 
are set forth below in the form of questions.   
 A “no” answer to any one or more of the following questions normally signifies that 
just and proper cause did not exist.  In other words, such “no” means that the employer’s 
disciplinary decision contained one or more elements of arbitrary, capricious, 
unreasonable, and/or discriminatory action to such an extent that said decision constituted 
an abuse of managerial discretion warranting the arbitrator to substitute his judgment for 
that of the employer. 
 The answers to the questions in any particular case are to be found in the evidence 
presented to the arbitrator at the hearing thereon. Frequently, of course, the facts are such 
that the guide lines cannot be applied with slide-rule precision.   
 The Questions 
 1. Did the [c]ompany give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the 
possible or probable disciplinary consequences of the employee’s conduct? 
 Note 1: Said forewarning or foreknowledge may properly have been given orally by 
management or in writing through the medium of typed or printed sheets or books of shop 
rules and of penalties for violation thereof. 
 Note 2: There must have been actual oral or written communications of the rules and 
penalties to the employee. 
 Note 3: A finding of lack of such communication does not in all cases require a “no” 
answer to Question No. 1.  This is because certain offenses such as insubordination, 
coming to work intoxicated, drinking intoxicating beverages on the job, or theft of the 
property of the company or of fellow employees are so serious that any employee in the 
industrial society may properly be expected to know already that such conduct is offensive 
and heavily punishable. 
 Note 4: Absent any contractual prohibition or restriction, the company has the right 
unilaterally to promulgate reasonable rules and give reasonable orders; and the same need 
not have been negotiated with the union. 
 2. Was the company’s rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) the orderly, 
efficient, and safe operation of the [c]ompany’s business and (b) the performance that the 
company might properly expect of the employee?  
 Note: If an employee believes that said rule or order is unreasonable, he must 
nevertheless obey same (in which case he may file a grievance thereover) unless he 
sincerely feels that to obey the rule or order would seriously and immediately jeopardize 
his personal safety and/or integrity.  Given a firm finding to the latter effect, the employee 
may properly be said to have had justification for his disobedience. 
 3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee, make an effort to 
discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of 
management? 
 Note 1: This is the employee’s “day in court” principle.  An employee has the right to 
know with reasonable precision the offense with which he is being charged and to defend 
his behavior. 
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 Note 2: The company’s investigation must normally be made before its disciplinary 
decision is made.  If the company falls to do so, its failure may not normally be excused on 
the ground that the employee will get his day in court through the grievance procedure 
after the exaction of discipline.  By that time there has usually been too much hardening of 
positions. 
 Note 3: There may of course be circumstances under which management must react 
immediately to the employee’s behavior.  In such cases the normally proper action is to 
suspend the employee pending investigation, with the understanding that (a) the final 
disciplinary decision will be made after the investigation and (b) if the employee is found 
innocent after the investigation he will be restored to his job with full pay for time lost. 
 4. Was the [c]ompany’s investigation conducted fairly and objectively? 
 Note: At said investigation the management official may be both “prosecutor” and 
“judge,” but he may not also be a witness against the employee. 
 5. At the investigation did the “judge” obtain substantial evidence or proof that the 
employee was guilty as charged? 
 Note: It is not required that the evidence “be preponderant, conclusive, or “beyond 
reasonable doubt.”  But the evidence must be truly substantial and no flimsy.  
 6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly and without 
discrimination to all employees? 
 Note 1: A “no” answer to this question requires a finding of discrimination and 
warrants negation or modification of the discipline imposed. 
 Note 2: If the company has been lax in enforcing its rules and orders, and decides 
henceforth to apply them rigorously, the company may avoid a finding of discrimination 
by telling all employees beforehand of its intent to enforce hereafter all rules as written. 
 7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular case 
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven offense and (b) the 
record of the employee in his service with the company? 
 Note 1: A trivial proven offense does not merit harsh discipline unless the employee 
has properly been found guilty of the same or other offenses a number of times in the past. 
(There is no rule as to what number of previous offenses constitutes a “good,” a “fair,” or a 
“bad” record.  Reasonable judgment thereon must be used.) 
 Note 2:  An employee’s record of previous offenses may never be used to discover 
whether he was guilty of the immediate or latest one.  The only proper use of his record is 
to help determine the severity of discipline once he has properly been found guilty of the 
immediate offense. 
 Note 3: Given the proven offense for two or more employees, their respective records 
provide the only proper basis “for ‘discriminating’ among them” in the administration of 
discipline for said offense.  Thus, if employee A’s record is significantly better than those 
of employees B, C, and D, the company may properly give A a lighter punishment than it 
gives the others for the same offense; and this does not constitute true discrimination.  
Grief Bros., 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 557–59 (emphasis in original).   
 
To the last question, Arbitrator Daugherty added in Enterprise Wire Co.: 
 
 Note 4: Suppose that the record of the arbitration hearing establishes firm “Yes” to 
answers to all the first six questions.  Suppose further that the proven offense of the 
accused employee was a serious one, such as drunkenness of the job; but the employee’s 
record had been previously unblemished over a long continuous period of employment 
with the company.  Should the company be held arbitrary and unreasonable if it decided to 
discharge such an employee? The answer depends of course on all the circumstances.  But, 
as one of the country’s oldest arbitration agencies, the National Railroad Adjustment 
Board, has pointed out repeatedly in innumerable decisions on discharge cases, leniency is 
the prerogative of the employer rather than of the arbitrator; and the latter is not supposed 
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subject,144 arbitrators continue to apply their own distinct standards and 
variations.  Some arbitrators will infer a just cause limitation even when 
such a provision is not a part of the applicable contract.145    
Under Arbitrator Daugherty’s seven tests, an employer must provide 
forewarning to the employee about the disciplinary consequences of the at-
issue behavior in most cases.146  It also requires that the work rule allegedly 
breached be reasonably related to the effective and efficient functioning of 
the enterprise and the employer have concluded that the employee engaged 
in misconduct following a fair investigation and before the imposition of 
discipline.147  Lastly, the applicable rule must have been applied without 
discrimination and the penalty imposed or proposed must be reasonably 
related to the seriousness of the misconduct and the employee’s 
employment record.148  
 The elements of the seven tests overlap and supplement aspects of the 
procedural and substantive aspects of just cause dating back to the Gilded 
Age.  Like the 19th Century civil service rules, the seven tests mandate 
notice and an opportunity to be heard and prohibit discrimination between 
employees.149  The seven tests formulation, however, adds a number of 
important elements to the principles of workplace due process, which are 
central to the proper application of just cause to social networking: the 
development and distribution of lawful work rules that include notice of 
potential for discipline for violations of those rules, progressive discipline, 
and a fair employer investigation and fact-finder.150  The seven tests have 
become less relevant today in most workplaces due to the current low level 
of union density.  The low density rate has resulted in the consequential 
dissipation of what David Brody once termed workplace contractualism: 
                                                                                                                           
to substitute his judgment.  In this area for that of the company unless there is compelling 
evidence that the company abused its discretion.  This is the rule, even though an 
arbitrator, if he had been the original “trial judge,” might have imposed a lesser penalty.  
Actually the arbitrator may be said in an important sense to act as an appellate tribunal 
whose function is to discover whether the decision of the trial tribunal (the employer) was 
within the bounds of reasonableness above set forth.  In general, the penalty of dismissal 
for a really serious first offense does not in itself warrant a finding of company 
unreasonableness.  Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 365. 
 
 144 See ADOLPH M. KOVEN & SUSAN L. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS (Kenneth May ed., 
3d ed. 2006). 
 145 Abrams & Nolan, supra note 135, at 594–95. 
 146 See Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 363. 
 147 Id. at 363–64. 
 148 Id. at 364. 
 149 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep (BNA) at 363–64. 
408 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:381 
 
enforcement of collective bargaining terms such as just cause, grievance 
and arbitration provisions.151   
Before analyzing how just cause should be applied to social 
networking, we turn to a related but frequently overlooked body of law: 
legislatively mandated just cause.  In the public sector, successful lobbying 
by public employee unions since the early 20th Century led to the adoption 
of state tenure and due process laws similar to the federal Lloyd-La Follette 
Act of 1912.152  Today, states such as Pennsylvania, Montana, South 
Dakota, North Carolina, and Nebraska have codified a just cause standard 
for public sector employees.153   
A comprehensive national survey of state statutes is unnecessary to 
reveal the wide variations in how states have defined just cause.  Therefore, 
only a sampling is presented to highlight the definitional diversity.  Some 
state laws define just cause as being nothing more than proof of employee 
misconduct or incompetence that justifies discipline.154  Other statutes 
mandate procedural protections including notice and an opportunity to be 
heard,155 while others include prohibitions against discrimination and 
retaliation for protected activities.156 The statutes provide definitional 
standards—spanning from specifically enumerated examples of conduct 
that constitute just cause to broad generalizations requiring interpretation by 
those delegated to apply the law.  As evidenced by the codified differences, 
there is no clear guidance concerning how just cause should be applied, and 
underscores the difficulty of defining just cause through the legislative 
process.  
In Pennsylvania, the Civil Service Act limits the bases for discharging a 
non-probationary state employee by requiring just cause, without defining 
the phrase.157 Pennsylvania courts have interpreted just cause to mean 
                                                                                                                           
 
 151 DAVID BRODY, WORKPLACE CONTRACTUALISM: A HISTORICAL/COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
(1992), reprinted in IN LABOR’S CAUSE: MAIN THEMES ON THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 
221, 221 (1993).  
 152 Pub. L. No. 62-336, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012)). 
 153 See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.21.6506–.6507, .6509 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-824 (2014); 
25 N.C. ADMIN. CODE, 1I.2301 (2013); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.706 (West 2009); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §13-43-6.1 (West Supp. 2013). 
 154 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-824(4). 
 155 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (West Supp. 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (2013).  In 
the public sector, due process is constitutionally mandated when an employee has a protected property 
interest in continued employment emanating from statute or contract.  See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1980). 
 156 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.14; 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 741.905a (West 
2012). 
 157 71, § 741.807; see also Szablowski v. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 76 A.3d 590, 597 (Pa Commw. 
Ct. 2013) (reviewing case law defining “just cause” in the absence of a statutory definition). 
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“merit-related,” including an employee's competency and ability to perform 
the position “in some rational and logical manner.”158   Over time, the 
definition has evolved to include anti-discrimination principles stemming 
from another provision in that civil service law prohibiting discrimination 
based upon “political or religious opinions or affiliations because of labor 
union affiliations or because of race, national origin or other non-merit 
factors.”159  Procedurally, the rules applicable to just cause in Pennsylvania 
are notice with a clear statement of the reasons for the discipline,160 a 
formal hearing161 with the employer having the burden of proof,162 the 
availability of subpoenas, and the possibility of pre-hearing discovery.163  
Despite the controversial changes to tenure policies in Wisconsin, the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code still mandates just cause for the dismissal 
of a tenured University of Wisconsin faculty member.164  Substantively, the 
regulation recognizes faculty retain all of the rights and privileges of a 
citizen and the protections afforded by academic freedom, which must be 
considered in determining whether just cause exists.165  Defining just cause 
in this manner is particularly important because the contours of judicially 
recognized First Amendment protections for public employees are 
diminishing.166 The regulations also mandate an evidentiary investigation 
prior to the issuance of charges167 and require a number of due process 
guarantees including a formal statement of specific charges, a fair hearing 
                                                                                                                           
 
 158 Galant v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 626 A.2d 496, 497 n.2 (Pa.1993) (citing Corder, 
279 A2d at 371). 
 159 71, § 741.905a; see also Corder v. State Civil Serv. Com’n, 279 A.2d 368, 371 (Pa Commw. Ct. 
1971) (quoting § 741.905a). 
 160 See 71, § 741.950. 
 161 See id. § 741.951. 
 162 Mufson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 456 A.2d 736, 737 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) 
(citing Lewis v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Health, 437 A.2d 811 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)). 
 163 See 71, § 741.209 (“The commission shall have the power to secure by subpoena the attendance 
and testimony of witnesses and the production of books and papers.”); see also E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst., 
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Russell, 465 A.2d 1313, 1319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (ruling that only “some 
adequate form of discovery” is necessary to satisfy employee’s due process rights). 
 164 WIS. ADMIN. CODE UWS § 4.01(1) (2015), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/admin_code/uws 
/4.  On February 15, 2016, the Wisconsin Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System 
promulgated proposed regulatory changes concerning the dismissal of faculty.  See Notice of Submittal 
of Rule to Legislature, 2016 Wis. Admin. Reg. 722A3, CR 15-061 (Feb. 15, 2016), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/chr/all/cr_15_061.   
 165 Id. §4.01(2). 
 166 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–26 (2006) (establishing a per se constitutional rule 
that speech by a public employee pursuant to official duties is unprotected under the First Amendment 
but stating that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s 
customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”). 
 167 UWS §4.02(1). 
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with the burden of proof on the employer, a right to be heard, a right to 
counsel, an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and written findings of 
fact and recommendations.168   
South Dakota’s definition provides examples rather than a general 
definition of just cause.  In South Dakota, just cause for the discharge of 
teachers includes: “breach of contract, poor performance, incompetency, 
gross immorality, unprofessional conduct, insubordination, neglect of duty, 
or the violation of any policy or regulation of the school district.”169  Just 
cause termination for South Dakota state workers is defined through a list 
of twenty-six specifically identified employee actions or inactions.170  At 
the same time, the at-will doctrine has been codified in that state,171 with a 
judicially recognized just cause exception based upon the terms of an 
employee handbook.172 
Montana’s statute requiring just cause in the public sector provides a 
more balanced approach to defining the phrase.  The law ensures that any  
formal disciplinary action requires “just cause, due process and 
documentation, or other evidence of the facts . . . .”173  The statute defines 
just cause as:  
[R]easonable, job-related grounds for taking a disciplinary action based on 
failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, or disruption of agency 
operations.  Just cause may include, but is not limited to: an actual 
violation of an established agency standard, procedure, legitimate order, 
policy, or labor agreement; failure to meet applicable professional 
standards; criminal misconduct; wrongful discrimination; deliberate 
misconduct; negligence; deliberately providing false information on an 
employment application; willful damage to public or private property; 
workplace violence or intimidation; harassment; unprofessional or 
inappropriate behavior; or a series of lesser violations.174 
Procedurally, prior to imposing discipline, the employee must receive 
written notice of the factual basis for the discipline, expected improvements 
in behavior, if applicable, and the consequences if the employee fails to 
                                                                                                                           
 
 168 See id. §§4.02, .05–.06. 
 169 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-43-6.1 (West Supp. 2013). 
 170 S.D. ADMIN. R. 55:10:07:04 (2015), http://www.legis.sd.gov/Rules/DisplayRule.aspx?Rule=55: 
10:07:04.   
 171 See CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-4. 
 172 See Lesmeister v. Am. Colloid Co., 4 F.3d 631, 633 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 173 MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.21.6509(1) (2015). 
 174 Id. R. 2.21.6507(8); see also Christie v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2009 MT 364, ¶ 30, 353 Mont. 
227, 235, 220 P.3d 405, 410 (falsification of time record constitutes just cause). 
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improve.175  The employee is entitled to respond to the notice in writing or 
orally.176  
In contrast, Montana’s wrongful discharge statute prohibits a post-
probationary discharge that is retaliatory, violates an express provision of a 
written workplace policy, or is without “good cause.”177  The law defines 
“good cause” to mean “reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based 
on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s 
operation, or other legitimate business reason.”178  Although the statute 
provides job protections well beyond most jurisdictions,179 it was enacted to 
rein in the broad exception to the at-will employment doctrine created by 
the Montana Supreme Court, which held employers liable for terminations 
that would otherwise have been lawful.180  By enacting the statute, the 
legislature capped back pay awards to four years and provided methods for 
the parties to recover attorneys’ or arbitrators’ fees.181    
Unlike the state laws we have examined, Puerto Rico’s labor and 
employment statute provides its employees with a large array of job 
protection rights.182  Law 80 of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Law 
80”)183 mandates that employer must have just cause to discharge an 
employee without a fixed term of employment, and it imposes a 
                                                                                                                           
 
 175 R. 2.21.6509(3). 
 176 Id. R. 2.21.6509(5). 
 177 See MONT. CODE ANN. §39-2-904(1) (2015). 
 178 Id. § 39-2-903(5).  It excludes a termination “that is subject to any other state or federal statute 
that provides a procedure or remedy for contesting the dispute” and an employed covered by a written 
collective bargaining agreement or individual written employment contract.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-
912. 
 179 The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2015). 
 180 See LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from 
Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94, 108–09 (1990).  Prior to its passage, the 
Montana Supreme Court issued a line of decisions that essentially rejected the at-will doctrine by 
applying a good faith and fair dealing analysis to the employment relationship.  Id. at 96.  Thereafter, the 
defense bar sought legislation to cap the back pay awards.  See id. at 110–111 (1990); see also, Bradley 
T. Ewing et al., The Employment Effects of a “Good Cause” Discharge in Montana, 59 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 17, 21 (2005) (reviewing Montana’s unique employment legislation and observing that the 
good cause standard seems to “have increased the frequency of liability for wrongful discharge 
compared to the pre-1987 common law regime, but it also appears to have reduced the variance of 
damages awards—a tradeoff that would appeal to risk-averse employers.”). 
 181 See §§ 39-2-905(1), -914(4), -915.  
 182 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a–185m (2009).  Employees in Puerto Rico enjoy, with certain 
exceptions, mandatory holidays, see id. §302, annual (Christmas) bonuses, see id. §§ 501–507, a weekly 
day of rest, see id. §§ 295–299, and mandatory severance pay for termination without just cause, id. § 
185a.  
 183 Id. §§ 185a-185m. 
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compensatory penalty for a violation.184  Local 80 conflates “just cause” 
with “good cause” and defines good cause through a litany of acceptable 
reasons for termination including a pattern of misconduct.185  However, it 
also states that: 
A discharge made by the mere whim of the employer or without cause 
relative to the proper and normal operation of the establishment shall not 
be considered as a discharge for good cause.  Neither shall it be considered 
just cause for discharging an employee, his/her collaboration or 
expressions made by him/her pertaining to his/her employer's business 
before any administrative, judicial or legislative forum in Puerto Rico 
when said expressions are not of a defamatory character nor constitute 
disclosure of privileged information according to law.  In this last case, in 
                                                                                                                           
 
 184 See Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 1998).  Section 
185a of Law 80 states:  
  
 Every employee in commerce, industry, or any other business or work place, 
designated hereinafter as the establishment, in which he/she works for compensation of 
any kind, contracted without a fixed term, who is discharged from his/her employment 
without just cause, shall be entitled to receive from his/her employer, in addition to the 
salary he/she may have earned:  
 (a) The salary corresponding to two (2) months, as indemnity, if discharged within the 
first five (5) years of service; the salary corresponding to three (3) months if discharged 
after five years (5) and up to fifteen (15) years of service; the salary corresponding to six 
(6) months if discharged after fifteen (15) years of service.  
 (b) An additional progressive compensation equal to one (1) week for each year of 
service, if discharged within the first five (5) years of service; to two (2) weeks for each 
year of service, if discharged after five (5) years and up to fifteen (15) years of service; to 
three (3) weeks for each year of service if discharged after fifteen (15) years of service. 
 The years of service shall be determined on the basis of all the preceding accrued 
periods of work during which the employee worked for the employer prior to his/her 
discharge, but excluding those which, because of a previous discharge or severance, have 
been compensated or have been subject to judicial adjudication. 
 Notwithstanding what is provided in the first paragraph of this section, the mere fact 
that an employee renders services under a fixed term contract, in itself, shall not have the 
automatic effect of depriving him/her of the protection of §§ 185a–185m of this title, if the 
practice and circumstances involved or other evidence in the contracting were of such a 
nature that they tend to indicate the creation of an expectation of continuity in 
employment, or appears to be a bona fide employment contract for an indefinite period of 
time.  In these cases, the employees thus affected shall be deemed to have been contracted 
for an unspecific period of time.  Except when it concerns employees contracted for a 
certain bona fide term, or for a certain bona fide project, every separation, termination or 
dismissal of employees contracted for a certain term, or a certain project or job, or the non-
renewal of his/her contract, shall be presumed to constitute an unjust dismissal governed 
by §§ 185a–185m of this title. 
 
§ 185a. 
 185 See id. § 185b. 
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addition to any other corresponding adjudication, the employee thus 
discharged shall have the right to have an order issued for immediate 
restitution in his/her employment and to be compensated for an amount 
equal to the salaries and benefits not received from the date of discharge 
until a court orders reinstatement in his/hers employment.186 
The substantive and procedural differences in the statutory definitions 
reflect differing values about workplace fairness, which lies at the core of 
just cause.  Laws that define just cause to include substantive and 
procedural protections require consideration of both employer and 
employee actions and inactions.  Defining the phrase as prohibiting 
improperly motivated and discriminatory discipline is consistent with a key 
element of just cause dating back to the Gilded Age and current anti-
discrimination laws.  Finally, jurisdictions that treat the phrase as a mere 
synonym for employee misconduct or incompetence mirror Theodore 
Roosevelt’s 1902 formulation that the phrase means “any cause” to promote 
workplace efficiency. 
Next, we turn to the application of the principles of just cause discipline 
to social networking activities.  In so doing, we postulate how those general 
principles should be refined for the Web 2.0 culture and consider arbitral 
just cause decisions involving social media.   
IV.  DEFINING JUST CAUSE FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE  
NEW GILDED AGE  
In defining and applying just cause to social networking we must be 
mindful that social media can implicate employee speech, association and 
privacy interests as well as academic freedom in higher education.  It is a 
vital communicative tool for associational and expressive activities in an 
age of increased workplace decentralization, fissured workplaces, and the 
irregularity of work.  It has supplanted the home and other relatively 
intimate gathering spots for discussing workplace and other issues. 
Social media also implicates employer interests.  Those interests can 
vary depending on the post’s content, the particular equipment used, and 
whether the communication took place off-duty or during work.  As a 
result, the examination must explore precedent under the NLRA and other 
laws concerning the private sector, and the First Amendment and state laws 
with respect to the public sector.   
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To properly apply just cause requires recognition of the seismic societal 
changes resulting from social media including its impact on the behavior of 
employees and employers.  The scope of those changes reinforces the 
necessity that employers retain the burden of demonstrating just cause.  At 
the same time, enforceable workplace due process does not require 
wholesale incorporation of constitutionally mandated criminal procedural 
rules into the workplace with discharge being hyperbolically analogized to 
capital punishment. 
 Rather than being a mere communicative instrument, the design of 
social media impacts how individuals and entities harness and react to the 
power of the technology.187  In our age, the rapid societal changes and 
disruptions caused by social media demands greater consistency in just 
cause discipline. 
 The enforceability of just cause principles does not preclude 
termination for misconduct in cyberspace, as demonstrated by the 
arbitration decisions discussed below.   They do, however, place important 
and needed legal restraints on the inherent power to overreact granted by 
the at-will doctrine. 
 A. Just Cause and the Digital Divide 
 In the New Gilded Age, the digital divide caused by income inequality 
needs to be considered when applying just cause to electronic misconduct.  
Economic disparities result in employees using different means for 
accessing the internet. It is far more probable that the working poor will 
engage in personal social networking using employer-owned workplace 
equipment, rendering them more vulnerable to allegations of workplace 
misconduct.  According to a 2014 Pew Research Internet Project study, 
over 71% of adults who surf the internet use Facebook, with the highest 
percentage being among those with incomes below $50,000.188 Individuals 
with household incomes below $50,000 are less likely to engage in social 
networking with a smartphone.189  Statistics from the United States Census 
Bureau reveal that the working poor are far less likely to engage in social 
media at home: 45.3% of individuals with a household income of less than 
                                                                                                                           
 
 187 See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 46–48 
(2010) (summarizing the historic debate between instrumentalists and determinists when it comes to 
human interaction with technology). 
 188 Social Media Update 2013: Facebook Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan 8, 2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/01/08/social-media-update-2013/facebook-users/. 
 189 Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-
networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
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$25,000 access the internet at their dwelling and 62.3% of people with 
household incomes of between $25,000-49,000 do the same.190  In contrast, 
89.5% of households with incomes of $150,000.00 or more access the 
internet at home.191   
These statistics illustrate how strict enforcement of a neutral policy 
prohibiting the use of workplace equipment for personal social networking 
will have a disparate impact on the working poor who have limited access 
to the internet outside of the workplace.  Despite the existence of the digital 
divide, our research has not found precedent where a court or an arbitrator 
considered a claim that the neutral application of a work rule concerning 
social media had a disparate impact on low wage workers. 
 B. Notice Through Workplace Rules and Training 
Two essential components of just cause when applied to social 
networking are lawful and reasonable employment rules and appropriate 
training.  Contemporary market and cultural forces necessitate both policies 
and training.  Unlike other consumer products, developers of social media 
and producers of laptops, tablets, and smartphones lack legal and market-
based incentives to provide understandable consumer information despite 
the inherent dangers resulting from indiscriminate use.  In fact, the software 
is designed to encourage automatic, rapid, and continuous use resulting in 
the maximization of data collection.   
The ubiquity of personal devices, the prevalence of social networking, 
and the profits gained from the use of the accumulated data, demonstrate 
that the designers have succeeded in creating a cyber-universe that 
discourages moderation and discernment.  As a result, clear, reasonable, and 
lawful workplace rules, along with related training, are necessary elements 
of just cause as applied to social networking.   They are the most direct 
means for providing notice to employees of the potential for discipline for 
electronic communicative misconduct.   
Historically, notice has always been a central element of just cause.  At 
a minimum, it requires the employee be informed of the basis for the 
discipline along with an opportunity to respond.192  Those aspects of notice 
have been central to just cause since it was introduced by McKinley.  Since 
the Gilded Age, just cause standards have evolved as reflected in the seven 
                                                                                                                           
 
 190 Computer and Internet Use in the United States: Reported Internet Usage for Individuals 3 Years 
and Older, by Selected Characteristics: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/comp
uter/publications/2012.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 191 Id. 
 192 See FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 52.  
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tests.193  Today, contractual just cause obligates an employer to inform 
employees of the potentiality of discipline for certain conduct, with the 
exception of offenses that a reasonable employee would understand 
constitutes misconduct such as theft and unlawfully motivated 
discrimination.194  
It should be self-evident that “employers with well-written 
comprehensive policies governing the nexus between social media and the 
workplace are more likely to prevail in discipline and discharge grievance 
arbitrations.”195  In order to satisfy just cause, such rules must be clear and 
reasonably related to the employer’s operation or employee work 
performance.196  As Ariana R. Levinson has written, “rules prohibiting 
personal use of company computers and other devices” are generally upheld 
in just cause cases.197  Similarly, Heather A. Morgan and Felicia A. Davis 
have observed that “[c]ourts have had no difficulty concluding that an 
employer may discipline employees who use social media in violation of 
clearly stated policy use provisions, such as using social media during 
working hours.”198   
Drafting social media rules to satisfy just cause is admittedly difficult 
because social networking by its very nature can implicate protected 
concerted activities, and legally protected off-duty activities.  Even without 
a specific social media policy, pre-existing work rules can form a legitimate 
basis for just cause discipline with social networking being the medium for 
the communicative misconduct.199  Rules concerning social media can be 
imposed through a stand-alone policy, a supplement to an electronic-use 
policy concerning the employer’s equipment, or be included in a “bring 
your own device” (“BYOD”) policy.200  
BYOD policies reflect the growing practice among some employers of 
permitting employees to utilize personal electronic equipment to access 
employer data and applications.201  While a BYOD policy is usually 
                                                                                                                           
 
 193 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 194 Patrick R. Westerkamp & Rebecca Esmi, Arbitrating Social Media Grievances, N.J. LAW. Apr. 
2011, at 28, 30. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Ariana R. Levinson, What Hath the Twenty First Century Wrought? Issues in the Workplace 
Arising from New Technologies and How Arbitrators Are Dealing with Them, 11 TRANSACTIONS: 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 9, 13 (2010). 
 198 Heather A. Morgan & Felicia A. Davis, Social Media and Employment Law: Summary of Key 
Cases and Legal Issues, ABA NAT’L SYMP. ON TECH. LAB. & EMP. L., May 2014, at 1, 20–22. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See id. at 18. 
 201 See id. 
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motivated by a desire to attract and retain digital natives, such policies 
highlight thorny issues caused by personal and workplace data being 
retained in one device.  Among the issues that Morgan and Davis state 
should be addressed in a BYOD policy are: (1) the employee’s privacy 
interests in using a personal device for business purposes; (2) the 
employer’s right to delete data from the employee’s device; (3) document 
or data retention after an employee leaves the firm; and (4) monitoring 
through a device’s GPS tracking capability.202   
In general, policies concerning the use of workplace equipment are 
incentivized by the law.  Court decisions hold that an employer can avoid 
running afoul of employee privacy protections under the Electronic 
Communications Protection Act of 1986 (“ECPA”)203 and the Fourth 
Amendment204 by simply unilaterally imposing a work rule that employees 
have no expectation of privacy when utilizing a piece of workplace 
computer equipment.205   
Just cause principles teach, however, that mere promulgation of a rule is 
generally insufficient to provide necessary notice.206  Knowledge cannot be 
presumed based solely on the electronic distribution of a rule or by  adding 
the rule to the intranet or a handbook.  Direct interactions are far more 
likely to lead to effective communications.  Training is essential for 
providing notice of the rules applicable  to social networking.   
Many employers already conduct training on a regular basis to 
supplement policies prohibiting sexual harassment, bullying, and workplace 
violence.207  The training on those subjects is due, in part, to the complexity 
of interactive human behavior, the need to encourage behavioral changes, 
and the importance of employees understanding the impact their conduct 
                                                                                                                           
 
 202 See id. at 18–19. 
 203 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2510–2521, 
2701–2711, 3117, 3121–3127). 
 204 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.”). 
 205 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755–60 (2010); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709, 714–19 (1987) (applying the operational workplace realities in determining whether a public 
employee had an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); see also, e.g., William A. 
Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must Be Honest, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 49, 61 n.68 (2008) (discussing the consent exceptions under the ECPA). 
 206 See Grief Bros. Cooperage, 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555, 558–59 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.). 
 207 See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).(recognizing an affirmative defense to certain hostile work 
environment sexual harassment claims based upon  workplace policy and training concerning sexual 
harassment).   
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can have on others.  Employers can supplement such training with explicit 
references to electronic forms of misconduct.208   
The value of workplace training about social media is exemplified by 
employers being advised to “train their employees involved in the recruiting 
and hiring process to understand the risks associated with learning about an 
applicants’ personal information” through social media,209 and by at least 
one police department sending its supervisors to “twitter school.”210  
Training is particularly important because misinterpretation of electronic 
communications is more likely due to the lack of voice intonation and facial 
expression in electronic communications.211   
Workplace training can provide reinforcement and clarification 
concerning social media rules as well as explain the benefits and pitfalls of 
social networking.  As one arbitrator noted in a social media case:  
We need to grant some slack to today’s young people which I define as 
those under 30 . . . .  [W]e need to recognize that young people today need 
more time to grow up and become responsible members of society.  This 
requires us to inform them of good as well as inappropriate forms of 
conduct.212   
Contrary to the arbitrator’s ageist assumptions, there is an equal need for 
workplace training for all those who are technologically unsophisticated 
and who embrace social media without understanding its power, benefits, 
and pitfalls.      
The application of enforceable just cause standards has not impaired 
employers from successfully imposing discipline for social media 
misconduct under pre-existing policies.213  As discussed below, other 
policies that can form the basis for just cause discipline for social 
networking including sexual harassment policies, conduct unbecoming or 
morality policies, and patient privacy policies.214   
                                                                                                                           
 
 208 See Jeffrey Englander, et al., Social Media’s Impacts on the Employer-Employee Relationship, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 55, at I-1 (Mar. 21, 2014). 
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 212 Police Dep’t, Police Ass’n, and Emp’r, 2013 Lab. Arb. Supp. (BNA) 148178 (Sept. 23, 2013) 
(Visco, Arb.).  
 213 See infra notes 230–33 and accompanying text. 
 214 See Am. Red Cross v. Teamsters, Local 507, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1696, 1703 (2008) 
(Ruben, Arb.); Hospital, 2013 AAA LEXIS 116, at *10 (Mar. 12, 2013) (Bornstein, Arb.); University, 
2008 AAA LEXIS 889, at *21 (Jan. 10, 2008) (Siegel, Arb.). 
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In one case, an arbitrator found that an airline policy prohibiting 
employees from making publicly abusive, unprofessional comments toward 
management was a basis for just cause discipline because an employee’s 
abusive and threatening posts toward management were accessible to at 
least one of his coworkers.215  An employer’s internet policy prohibiting 
personal use of workplace computers was found to be a sufficient predicate 
for the just cause discipline of an employee for accessing a social media site 
during work hours.216   
  A sexual harassment policy and training was found sufficient to satisfy 
just cause discipline for posting sexually harassing comments directed at a 
co-worker or arguably, that a fellow coworker could access.217  Anti-
violence and anti-discrimination policies can also form the basis for just 
cause termination for social media posts.218  A discriminatory blog post 
about a supervisor was found to constitute just cause for a discharge 
because it constituted gross misconduct that violated the employer’s anti-
harassment policy.219   
One arbitrator found that just cause existed to discipline a correction 
officer for an off-duty post because it violated a work rule that prohibited 
the discrediting of the employer.220  Another arbitrator concluded a 
university had just cause to discipline two campus security police officers 
for separate posts under its conduct unbecoming policy.221   In that case, one 
officer posted a picture of himself next to a security vehicle on a dating 
website along with his title and his sexual preferences.222  The homophobic 
blog postings by a Michigan Assistant Attorney General targeted at a gay 
                                                                                                                           
 
 215 See AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Council 57, Ass’n of Flight Attendants, 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
254, 260–61 (2012) (Goldstein, Arb.).   
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 218 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, Local 9548 v. Tenaris Algoma Tubes Inc., 2014 
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 219 Baker Hughes, Inc. v. United Steelworkers Int’l Union Region VII, Local 13-391, 128 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) 37, 43 (2010) (Baroni, Arb.). 
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college student leader was found to constitute just cause because it was 
conduct unbecoming of a state employee.223  Lastly, a nurse was disciplined 
under a patient privacy policy for taking a picture of a deceased patient and 
posting it with information about the patient’s funeral.224   
In determining whether a workplace social media rule is reasonable and 
a legitimate basis for discipline, its content and application must not violate 
laws that circumscribe restrictions on protected employee workplace-related 
civil liberties.225  As a result, the arbitration of just cause discipline can 
include disputes over whether the at-issue social media activity is legally 
protected,226 or whether the workplace rule violates federal or state law. 
In the private sector, the implementation or maintenance of a social 
media policy can violate the NLRA if it is demonstrated that the policy was 
applied to discipline an employee for a protected concerted activity under 
Section 7 of the NLRA.227 The policy can also violate the NLRA if it can be 
reasonably interpreted to be coercive, prohibit concerted protected activity, 
or if it was implemented in response to union activity.228   
Workplace policies that promote civility or courtesy,229 or prohibit such 
things as “negative comments” and “negativity” have been found to violate 
the NLRA because they can reasonably discourage employees from 
engaging in protected concerted activity.230   
In the public sector, the First Amendment constrains the enforceable 
scope of workplace policies relating to the substance of employee social 
networking.231  A public employer has a higher burden when seeking to 
defend the constitutional legitimacy of a policy that restricts employee 
expressive activities concerning issues of public concern that were not made 
pursuant to official duties than when defending a particular adverse 
                                                                                                                           
 
 223 Shirvell v. Dep’t of Attorney Gen., 866 N.W.2d 478, 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015). 
 224 Hospital, 2013 AAA LEXIS 116, at *10 (Mar. 12, 2013) (Bornstein, Arb.).  
 225 See Vista Nuevas Head Start, Local 1640 v. Michigan AFSCME Council 25, Local 1640, 129 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1519, 1525 (2011) (Van Dagens, Arb.). 
 226 Id. (rejecting union argument that social media posts constituted protected concerted activity). 
 227 See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 655 (2004). 
 228 See id. 
 229 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 164, 2012 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 679, at *2 (2012). 
 230 Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp., 360 N.L.R.B. 70, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 236, at *20 (2014). 
 231 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995).  The Court 
recognized that public sector employees “have not relinquished ‘the First Amendment rights they would 
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest.’”  It went on to note that the 
employees’ status as public employees “has no more bearing on the quality . . . of their literary output” 
than it would on another citizen.  Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will 
Cty, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
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action.232  When defending a policy restriction on free expression, a public 
employer “must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a 
vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and 
future expression are outweighed by that expression’s  ‘necessary impact on 
the actual operation’ of the Government.”233   
In addition, policy restrictions on speech are subject to constitutional 
challenge as being overbroad and vague.234  The constitutional obstacles in 
drafting a lawful social media policy is reflected in a decision by the New 
York Court of Appeals, which struck down an anti-cyberbullying statute 
because it was facially overbroad and prohibited constitutionally protected 
speech.235  Concerns over policy vagueness are most acute in the field of 
higher education due to the impact a policy can have on academic freedom.  
The University of South Dakota’s conduct policy, however, was found not 
to be unconstitutionally vague based on a judicial determination that “[t]he 
outer contours of the civility clause [in the policy] perhaps are imprecise, 
but many instances of faculty misconduct would fall clearly within the 
clause’s proscriptions, thus precluding the conclusion that the policy is 
facially unconstitutional.”236  The at-issue university policy stated: 
Faculty members are responsible for discharging their instructional, 
scholarly and service duties civilly, constructively and in an informed 
manner.  They must treat their colleagues, staff, students and visitors with 
respect, and they must comport themselves at all times, even when 
expressing disagreement or when engaging in pedagogical exercises, in 
ways that will preserve and strengthen the willingness to cooperate and to 
give or to accept instruction, guidance or assistance.237 
Another set of laws that limits the lawful scope of social media policies 
are state laws prohibiting discrimination with respect to employee off-duty 
conduct.  States such as Colorado238 and New York239 have enacted laws to 
protect employees’ right to engage in off-duty lawful activities.  While the 
specific scope of each state’s statute varies, they place limitations on an 
                                                                                                                           
 
 232 See id. at 468; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006); Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 
2381–82 (2014). 
 233 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571). 
 234 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); San Filippo 
v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1126 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 235 People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 488 (N.Y. 2014). 
 236 Keating v. Univ. of S.D., 569 F. App’x 469, 471 (8th Cir. 2014).  
 237 Id. at 470. 
 238 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2015). 
 239 N.Y. LAB. LAW §201-d(2)(b)–(c) (McKinney 2015).  
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employer’s discretion in controlling off-duty activities that may include 
social networking.240  One commentator has argued that such laws are 
necessary due to the ability of an employer to monitor employee off-duty 
conduct by reviewing social media posts.241   
Colorado’s lawful activities law prohibits an employer from: 
[T]erminat[ing] the employment of any employee due to that employee’s 
engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during 
nonworking hours[,] unless [the] restriction . . . [r]elates to a bona fide 
occupational requirement, . . . is reasonably and rationally related to the 
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a 
particular group of employees, rather than to all employees of the 
employer[,] or . . . [i]s necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any 
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of 
interest.”242   
On its face, the Colorado law does not bar a discharge for violating a 
workplace rule that prohibits social networking with the use of an 
employer’s equipment, prohibits the use of social media for personal use 
during working hours, or bans posts found to be inconsistent with an 
employee’s duties.243  
New York’s lawful activities statute protects off-duty political and 
recreational activities that take place outside work hours, off of the 
employer’s premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other 
property.244  Political activities are defined in the statute to include, “(i) 
running for public office, (ii) campaigning for a candidate for public office, 
or (iii) participating in fund-raising activities for the benefit of a candidate, 
political party[,] or political advocacy group . . . .”245  What constitutes a 
recreational activity is statutorily defined as “leisure-time activity, for 
which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally 
engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, 
games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and 
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 241 Jean M. Roche, Why Can’t We Be Friends?: Why California Needs a Lifestyle Discrimination 
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similar material . . . .”246  New York’s law would clearly protect employee 
social networking tied to partisan political activity so long as the activity is 
not during work time or done with the employer’s equipment including 
employer issued smartphones.247  The larger unresolved issue is whether 
social networking constitutes a protected recreational activity equivalent to 
a game, hobby, reading or the viewing of television, movies and similar 
material.  At present, the case law is limited on the question of what 
constitutes a protected recreational activity under New York’s law.248  
C. Reasonableness and Fairness of the Employer’s Investigation 
The reasonableness and fairness of an employer’s investigation are also 
essential for satisfying just cause.  This is true because electronic data can 
be easily manipulated or misconstrued.  Our contemporary culture provides 
strong incentives for over-reaction and under-investigation in the face of 
purported electronic misconduct.  Reason and deliberation are often in short 
supply and counterintuitive in the hyper-kinetic electronic age.  Precipitous 
disciplinary action is particularly tempting in the face of adverse publicity 
and political or economic pressure resulting from a posted picture, video, or 
comment that has gone viral.  
  No scenario better illustrates the importance of a fair and reasonable 
workplace investigation in the New Gilded Age than the circumstances 
surrounding the resignation of Shirley Sherrod from her position as Georgia 
State Director of Rural Development at the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.249  Sherrod’s experience is a cautionary tale involving 
manipulated material that went viral resulting in an unjustifiable adverse 
employer action.250  It took only ten hours from the posting of the video 
excerpts of her speech until she was forced to resign by officials who did 
                                                                                                                           
 
 246 Id. § -d(1)(b). 
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not investigate the accuracy of the posted excerpt.251  Moreover, she was 
compelled to resign without being given an opportunity to defend herself.252  
It was only later revealed that the video excerpts were substantively 
misleading.253 While her supervisors’ need to respond to Sherrod’s 
purported misconduct is understandable, it does not excuse them from 
forcing her to resign rather than placing her on administrative leave pending 
an investigation before making a final decision to discipline or to request 
her resignation. 
A fair and reasonable investigation of Sherrod would have included a 
review of a video of the entire speech along with an investigatory interview 
aimed at determining the substance of her comments and her intended 
meaning.  Following those steps, the investigation’s focus would have 
turned to whether she violated agency policies and rules, whether there was 
any justification for those violations, and whether she was engaged in 
protected speech.254   
The investigation regarding the homophobic blog postings by a 
Michigan Assistant Attorney is a strong counterexample to the Sherrod 
case.  In the Michigan case, the investigation included interviews with forty 
individuals including the target of the posts prior to the attorney’s 
discharge.255  The thoroughness of that investigation resulted in a record 
demonstrating just cause and provided relevant evidence for the employer’s 
defense against a claim that the attorney’s discipline constituted a violation 
of his First Amendment rights.256   
The consequences that can result when an employer fails to conduct a 
thorough disciplinary investigation are exemplified by another well-
publicized case involving a rapidly distributed video relating to misconduct: 
the arbitration decision and award setting aside the indefinite suspension of 
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football player Ray Rice for the physical assault of his then-fiancé.257  Rice 
had originally been penalized by the NFL with a two-game suspension and 
an additional fine of one game’s salary after admitting, during an 
investigatory meeting, that he hit his then fiancé in a hotel elevator that was 
corroborated by a surveillance video showing them leaving the elevator.258  
Although the NFL had knowledge of a second video capturing the actual 
assault inside the elevator, it took no action to obtain and view it.259  
Following the wide public broadcast and distribution of the second video 
and the resulting uproar, the NFL imposed a second more stringent penalty, 
which was vacated by the arbitrator on the grounds that Rice had already 
been penalized for the assault following the initial investigation and had not 
misled the NFL commissioner during the prior investigatory interview.260 
The importance of prudent and thorough investigatory steps before 
imposing discipline is equally true when it comes to alleged employee 
electronic misconduct.  Generally, employers discover inappropriate posts 
in three ways.  The employee had befriended the employer or a manager 
thereby permitting access to the employee’s posts.  Even more commonly, 
the employer learns of an inappropriate post from a co-worker or another 
Facebook friend of the employee.  A third, less frequent, means of 
discovery is through employer surveillance of employee social media 
pages. 
The discovery of an inappropriate post should trigger the 
commencement, and not the conclusion, of an investigation.  The conduct 
of the investigation should be assigned to a detached employer 
representative to follow where the probative evidence leads.261  To 
determine whether the online activity violated an existing rule or policy, 
substantial evidence must be gathered regarding whether, when and how the 
employee accessed the social media page to make the post.  A fact-based 
determination must be made to determine if the at-issue post was made by 
the subject employee and what was the employee’s intent and purpose.  For 
example, a forensic investigation of an employee’s computer led one 
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arbitrator to conclude the employer lacked just cause to terminate an 
employee because the downloading of the child pornography might have 
been inadvertent or done by another employee.262  This is not to suggest that 
just cause requires a forensic examination as part of every investigation.  By 
its very nature, social media posts are accessible without a forensic 
examination.  A forensic examination becomes necessary only when a 
reasonable investigator recognizes that it is necessary in order to resolve a 
conflict or inconsistency in the evidence already gathered.   
The post’s content also must be examined within the larger context of 
the exchanges.  Humor, facetiousness and sarcasm are easily misunderstood 
in cyberspace.  In most cases, an employer cannot presume how a recipient 
or viewer of an employee’s post interpreted or reacted to its content without 
gathering additional probative evidence.263  In addition, the investigation 
must consider whether the social networking constituted a protected activity 
under federal or state law. 264  
The potential for a post to be misattributed, manipulated, or 
misconstrued is even greater than a video, as in Sherrod’s case.265  The 
internet permits individuals to post pseudonymously. Without an 
investigation, it is difficult to know with certainty the identity of the person 
who made the post. Social media accounts can be accessed by anyone who 
knows the username and password.  An employee can still be subject to just 
cause discipline, however, if the investigation finds that inappropriate 
online content was posted by someone who had authorization to log-in and 
post on the employee’s page.266   
The interactive nature of social media posts can result in 
misinterpretations particularly when more than two individuals engage in an 
electronic dialogue.  The ability to repost makes investigations more 
problematic.  Without a technically skilled investigator it might be difficult 
to determine where a post originated.  In some investigations it may matter 
whether the employee created the post, adopted it, or “liked” it.    
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Lastly, state and federal laws circumscribe the tools an employer may 
use during an investigation into alleged misconduct related to social 
networking.  By definition, these laws help define the contours of 
reasonableness when it comes to employer investigations.  Over fifteen 
states have enacted social media laws prohibiting employers from requiring 
an employee to disclose a personal username and password.267  While the 
specific prohibitions and exceptions of the enacted legislation may differ, 
they reflect a growing national sentiment against an employer having 
unbridled access to an employee’s social media activities.  The federal 
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),268 and similar state laws, also 
prohibits employers from accessing an employee’s social media account 
with privacy settings without appropriate authorization.269  The use of 
subterfuge or coercion by employer to gain access to an employee’s account 
will not be found to be a reasonable investigatory tool and might violate the 
SCA.270   
D.  Non-Discriminatory Application of Rules and Penalties 
 A central component of just cause since its introduction into American 
labor law in the 19th Century is the principle of non-discrimination.271  
Even before McKinley’s amendment, federal Civil Service Rule II 
prohibited discharges motivated by partisanship or religion and mandated 
that “penalties like in character shall be imposed for like offenses.”272 The 
centrality of non-discrimination was reinforced by Theodore Roosevelt 
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when he chose to redefine just cause to mean any cause other than political 
or religious.273   
The principle of non-discrimination mandates that an employer apply 
workplace rules and impose disciplinary penalties in an even-handed 
manner.274  Just cause, however, should not be conflated with an employer 
having a non-discriminatory reason for an adverse action under federal and 
state anti-discrimination laws. The elements of just cause obligate an 
employer to act in a manner that goes well beyond complying with 
employment discrimination laws.275 Improper disparate treatment under the 
just cause standard does not require proof of unlawful motivation.   
Nevertheless, an employer who satisfies the broader concept of non-
discrimination under just cause will have a stronger defense against a claim 
of unlawful discrimination, which is frequently premised upon disparate 
treatment.276  
  To satisfy just cause in the age of social media, an employer must apply 
relevant workplace rules in a non-disparate manner, and impose equivalent 
penalties concerning the same or similar types of electronic misconduct.  
For example, an employer cannot discipline one nurse under a workplace 
policy for photographing a patient and posting it on Facebook but not 
discipline other nurses who had also violated the policy.277  Similarly, an 
employer cannot terminate one employee found with sexually explicit 
materials on his workplace computer but impose only a ten-day suspension 
on another employee for having similar content on his workplace 
computer.278  The requirement of evenhandedness, however, does not 
preclude an employer from treating employees differently based on the 
respective work history of each employee.  
                                                                                                                           
 
 273 See EIGHTEENTH REPORT, supra note 108, at 308–09. 
 274 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin”). 
 275 See Kirst v. Grays Harbor Comty. Hosp., No. C14-5014 BHS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9355, at 
*11–12 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2014) (“While Kirst’s union agreement may have provided additional 
employee rights that the Hospital was required to meet before termination under the collective 
bargaining agreement, such as a finding of ‘just cause,’ the Hospital’s reason was far from ‘baseless,’ 
which is the standard under federal and state discrimination laws.  In other words, even if an arbitrator 
later found that the Hospital did not have just cause to terminate Kirst, this possibility does not show that 
the Hospital’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Kirst was pretextual.”). 
 276 E.g., § 12113 (2012) (providing defenses against allegations of discriminatory employment 
decisions on the basis of disability). 
 277 Hospital, 2013 AAA LEXIS 116, at *38–39 (Mar. 12, 2013) (Bornstein, Arb.). 
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E. Progressive Discipline and the Severity of the Penalty 
The doctrine of progressive discipline is another key element of just 
cause in the Web 2.0 era.  The purpose of progressive discipline is to 
enhance workplace productivity and stability through counseling and 
graduated levels of penalties aimed at correcting employee misbehavior.  If 
an employee’s behavior remains unaltered it can result in termination.279   
Progressive discipline is important because it encourages employer 
deliberativeness by utilizing disciplinary measures to correct employee 
misbehavior.  When an employer fails to take sufficient corrective action 
toward an employee’s misconduct, an arbitrator may find that the employer 
lacked just cause to discharge.280   
Arbitrators are just beginning to apply progressive discipline to social 
media misconduct.281  At present, it is difficult to discern a clear pattern 
concerning the application of progressive discipline involving employee 
social networking.  The scope of an arbitrator’s familiarity with social 
media may influence her or his approach. Some arbitrators are reluctant to 
impose discharge even when the at-issue posts are offensive, while others 
will sustain a discharge based on offensive posts that disparages the 
employer and demonstrates insolence toward supervisors.282   
 The most prominent exceptions to progressive discipline are extreme 
forms of misconduct or when a just cause provision is interpreted to not 
include progressive discipline.283  Progressive discipline has been found 
inapplicable when electronic misconduct involved threatening and extreme 
communications.284  For example, racist or sexist posts might  not be  found 
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amenable to progressive discipline.285  One arbitrator rejected a progressive 
discipline argument in a social media case involving sexual harassment by 
stating: 
Some offences are so serious that they warrant discharge.  An employee 
does not necessarily get one free sexual harassment before he loses his 
job. . . .  When men ‘joke’ about the sexual violence they should inflict on 
a woman she can reasonably be concerned that they may actually hurt 
her.286 
Another arbitrator has emphasized that the: 
[N]ature and frequency of the [Facebook postings] must be carefully 
considered to determine how insolent, insulting, insubordinate and/or 
damaging they were to the individual(s) or the company.  In some cases, 
the issue is whether the comments were so damaging or have so poisoned 
the workplace that it would no longer be possible for the employee to 
work harmoniously and productively with the other employees or for the 
company.287  
Like other types of misconduct cases, the appropriate degree of 
discipline in a social media case will depend on the content and context of 
the particular post and the employee’s work history.  Other considerations 
include the particular position held by the employee, the post’s visibility, as 
well as an employee’s voluntary action of removing the post and 
apologizing.288  In one case, an arbitrator did not sustain the termination of a 
police officer for crude work-related postings because the officer 
mistakenly believed that the postings were private.289  Instead, the arbitrator 
ordered that the officer could not maintain a social media account unless he 
comported with workplace policies.290  In another case, a white officer 
                                                                                                                           
 
 285 Police Dep’t, Police Ass’n, and Emp’r, 2013 Lab. Arb. Supp. (BNA) 148178 (Sept. 23, 2013) 
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 290 Id. 
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received a reduced disciplinary penalty for inadvertently forwarding a racist 
text message based on the officer’s immediate and repeated apologies, the 
officer’s exemplary work record, and because other employees were not 
discharged for similar misconduct.291   
V. CONCLUSION: A STEP FORWARD IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
 It has been over a century since President William McKinley 
introduced just cause into American labor law during the first Gilded Age.  
Following McKinley’s lead, just cause became central to industrial 
democracy and a cornerstone of workplace fairness.    
Last year marked the centennial of the final report of the United States 
Commission on Industrial Relations, chaired by Frank P. Walsh, which 
concluded that “[p]olitical freedom can exist only where there is industrial 
freedom; political democracy only where there is industrial democracy.”292  
The anniversary of that report went unnoticed like the anniversaries of so 
many other events in American labor history. Industrial democracy was 
once embraced “as a solution to the nation’s social and economic ills.”293  
In the New Gilded Age, industrial democracy has vanished from our 
national lexicon.  While enforceable just cause has survived, it is applicable 
to a relatively small percentage of workplaces that are subject to a 
negotiated just cause provision or statute.  The expectation of workplace 
fairness remains high even though it is an unenforceable concept unless 
tightly tied to an allegation of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. 
It is a testament to our contemporary culture that we read or hear about 
just cause primarily in the context of sports stories about the discipline of 
superstar professional athletes.294 Just cause discipline in that context is 
generally accepted.  In contrast, just cause and tenure protections are the 
subject to sustained and coordinated attacks in other segments of the 
economy.295  
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 Like the treatment of sports, social networking is a cultural 
phenomenon reflective of the values and contradictions of our times.  The 
rise of social media, along with the growth of fissured workplaces and job 
insecurity, has created a condition necessitating the reintroduction of 
enforceable just cause principles into more workplaces. Those principles are 
important, if not essential, because social networking has become central 
for communications involving work and work-related collective action.  
 As we have demonstrated in Part IV, supra, the reintroduction of just 
cause would not preclude the discharge of an employee for an extremely 
offensive or discriminatory posts. At the same time, just cause principles 
would encourage workplace stability, policies, and training that can lead to 
greater prudence and discernment concerning social media.  Furthermore, 
enforceable just cause standards would diminish the likelihood of 
discrimination litigation, the primary legal vehicle that non-unionized 
employees have to challenge what they consider to be a miscarriage of 
workplace justice.   
As Nelson Lichtenstein wrote at the turn of the 21st Century, “labor’s 
greatest deficit is of the ideas necessary to again insert working America 
into the heart of our national consciousness.”296 The creative deficit 
includes ways to respond to the growing insecurity of work.  There have 
been few recent efforts to bring just cause principles back into national 
consciousness through legislation or referenda.  One major exception to that 
deficit is the model just cause legislation supported by the State Innovation 
Exchange, which includes a definition for just cause.297    
 Enactment of broad just cause laws is unlikely in the near future.  
Nevertheless, targeted remedial legislation is possible in the New Gilded 
Age.  Increasingly, employers are mandating that, as a condition of 
employment, employees waive their right to pursue statutory claims in 
court, and arbitrate them under pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
provisions.298  While there is no definitive data of the number of employees 
subject to such agreements, “commentators estimate as much as a quarter or 
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more of all nonunion employees have signed arbitration clauses.”299  It is 
reasonable to expect that many of the arbitrated employment disputes under 
these contractual provisions involve social media. 
  By their very nature, pre-dispute agreements are contracts of adhesion.  
The requirement to arbitrate is imposed unilaterally prior to or during the 
employment relationship. Under current law, the obligation to arbitrate 
statutory workplace claims300 does not require the arbitration of the 
procedural and substantive fairness of the disciplinary action.301 
An important means for correcting that legal imbalance would be 
legislation requiring the arbitration of disciplinary disputes under a just 
cause standard when a pre-dispute agreement exists concerning an 
employee’s statutory claims.  
Ideally, the remedial legislation would be an amendment to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).302  The bill would enhance federal policy favoring 
arbitration of workplace disputes under the FAA.303 It would not end the 
arbitration of statutory claims under current law,304 nor would it eliminate 
the at-will doctrine generally, reforms that are not politically viable in the 
current era.305  Rather, the bill would be an incremental change to federal 
policy to ameliorate the imbalance caused by pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements, restrain employer arbitrariness, particularly as it relates to 
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social networking, and reintroduce just cause and workplace fairness into 
our national dialogue.   
Under the proposed FAA amendment, an employer would be obligated 
to arbitrate an employee’s objection to disciplinary action under just cause 
principles whenever the employee is subject to an agreement of 
employment mandating the arbitration of statutory employment claims 
under the FAA.    
The FAA amendment would define just cause as 
“non-disparate and lawful disciplinary action based on job related grounds 
such as: deliberate work-related misconduct; insubordination; 
demonstrated incompetence; violations of known workplace rules and 
related training; workplace violence; discrimination; or unprofessional 
behavior,” which was “imposed following a reasonable employer 
investigation with the employee being afforded written notice of the 
allegations, a reasonable opportunity to respond to those allegations, and 
after full consideration of the employee’s work record, and the at-issue 
behavior.” 
Excluded from its coverage would be employment relationships subject to a 
written collective bargaining agreement. 
 The proposed definition would codify a uniform set of just cause 
principles based on those developed from the time of the Gilded Age.  It 
would also provide employers with clear bases for taking disciplinary 
action, including adverse actions in response to improper employee 
behavior while social networking. 
 Under the proposal, discovery, the hearing, and the issues to be 
determined would be consolidated before a single arbitrator. The selected 
arbitrator would first hear and determine the employee’s grievance that the 
discipline violated just cause under the FAA amendment, with the employer 
having the burden of proof.   In many cases, an arbitrator’s ruling on that 
issue would narrow, if not eliminate, the issues to be determined concerning 
the statutory claims. If the just cause decision does not lead to a voluntary 
resolution of the statutory claim, the arbitration would proceed on the 
statutory claim, with the employee having the burden of proof. 
      An alternative non-federal approach would be through changes in state 
laws and policies.  As we have seen in Parts II and III, infra, the at-will 
doctrine stems from the common law, and states retain the authority to 
modify the master-servant relationship through legislation.    
Applying its police powers, a state might enact a law to create an 
implied covenant in all individual employment agreements requiring the 
arbitration of statutory claims to permit an employee to arbitrate a claim 
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that a disciplinary penalty was imposed without just cause.  To avoid 
probable federal preemption challenges, the state law would have to include 
a caveat that its application “shall not impair rights guaranteed by the 
Federal Arbitration Act.”  For the same reason, the arbitration of just cause 
under the proposed state law would be legally and functionally distinct from 
the arbitration of a statutory claim unless the parties consent to 
consolidation or a joint arbitral hearing. 
Another means for expanding the application of just cause principles 
would be to mandate the arbitration of just cause discipline by employees of 
governmental contractors.  Historically, this contractual vehicle has been an 
effective tool by federal and state governments to meet public policy goals. 
 Our proposed legislation would be a step forward in labor and 
employment law in the New Gilded Age by expanding the application of 
enforceable just cause principles to a larger number of workplaces. The 
reintroduction of just cause through these changes might trigger the 
resumption of a societal dialogue about the value of job security and 
workplace fairness principles.  
 Successful just cause legislation or state referenda in the 21st Century 
would demonstrate that the law did not look the other way in the face of the 
growth of contingent employment and the impact of social networking  
  

